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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 resulted in the failure of hundreds of banks in 
the U.S. alone, significant spikes in unemployment and disastrous consequences for firms 
and their stakeholders across numerous industries. In this context, with tremendous 
societal implications, this research draws on institutional theory and the strategic 
management literature to consider whether environmental shock alters the relationship 
between strategic conformity and firm performance. In doing so, this research also 
examines the contingency of board capital, arguing that environmental shock creates an 
opportunity for the board of directors to exert greater influence on the firm’s strategy-
setting and ultimately its performance. These predictions are tested using a sample of 348 
banks who were required to report financial information to the Federal Reserve from 2005 
to 2013, augmented by information on over 7,000 of these banks’ directors. While the 
results do not support the assertion that strategic deviation becomes more valuable during 
crisis, I do find evidence that board composition affects the strategic conformity of the 
firm. Further, the industry experience of board members is associated with higher firm 
performance over a multi-year period following a shock. The results also indicate that 
other related expertise obtained outside of the industry can also prove useful to the firm 
during periods of environmental shock. In addition to contributing a greater understanding 
of when and how board capital can affect firm outcomes, this research also provides a 
deeper understanding of one of the most disruptive economic events of the modern era.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
“[M]anagement scholarship has had little to say about the crisis… The 
paucity of papers explicitly relevant to the financial crisis was confirmed in a re-
reading of the corpus of articles in AMR and AMJ from 2008 until the present. The 
silence of management research on the subject suggests that our research seems 
to have almost entirely ignored probably the biggest economic and business event 
of our lives… the gap in our research of both theoretical and empirical papers 
should surely concern us as a community of scholars.” (Starkey, 2015: 13–14) 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 resulted in the failure of hundreds of banks in 
the U.S. alone, significant spikes in unemployment and disastrous consequences for firms 
and their stakeholders across numerous industries. Albeit with hindsight, many question, 
and attempt to explain, how sophisticated firms such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, 
and AIG failed because of their over-commitment to “toxic” assets (Bebchuk, Cohen, & 
Spamann, 2010; Bernanke, 2010; Levine, 2010; Saporito, 2009; Silva, 2009). Researchers 
point to lapses in risk management, possibly resulting from structural differences in the 
amount of authority given to the chief risk officer at the financial institution (Aebi, Sabato, 
& Schmid, 2012) and issues regarding the handling of problem loans (“written-off”) in 
financial statements (Staw, Barsade, & Koput, 1997). Yet, firms frequently fail even when 
the broader financial system is not under duress (Thornhill & Amit, 2003). 
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Are these business failures more likely to occur when a firm conforms to strategies 
prevalent in the industry? Or instead when the firm charts its own course? What role do 
board members play in making these decisions and charting the course for the firm? 
Existing theory suggests conflicting explanations. On one hand, institutional theory 
generally suggests that firms establish the greatest degree of legitimacy and thus improve 
their performance when conforming and mimicking industry leaders. In contrast, the 
strategic management literature assumes that organizations should seek to differentiate 
their strategies to improve financial performance vis-a-vis competitors and thereby other 
desired organizational outcomes, including survival. Despite these differing foci 
throughout management literature, a key dimension of an organization’s success or failure 
is the extent to which its strategies either differ from or conform to industry norms. 
Importantly, environmental shock may alter which theoretical explanations are most 
salient.  
I seek to resolve the ambiguity created between institutional theory and the 
strategic management literature by considering the importance of resource dependence 
theory during a crisis. Resource dependence theory (RDT), which focuses on the exchange 
of resources between organizations, asserts that organizations are most likely to survive 
when they effectively minimize their dependence on other organizations or maximize the 
dependence of other organizations on themselves (Ulrich & Barney, 1984). Strategic 
conformity increases the extent to which organizations are more likely to rely on a 
common pool of resources. Whereas financial resources may be abundant during times 
when an industry is performing well, their availability decreases during an environmental 
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shock. An abundance of financial resources during good times may increase competition 
for key resources such as human and physical capital. Further, while legitimacy may be 
easily obtainable via loose affiliation with an industry that is performing well, as scrutiny 
on an industry increases, legitimacy may be increasingly important to resource providers. 
For these reasons, it is unclear whether strategic conformity is more valuable when the 
industry is performing well (abundant financial resources, loose legitimacy expectations) 
or when the industry is in crisis (limited financial resources, strict legitimacy 
expectations). 
In this context, firm decision-makers or the upper-echelons of the firm arguably 
play a key role in establishing firm strategies. In particular, the board of directors has long 
been identified as a key set of actors able to provide critical resources to the firm, notably 
advice, information, and access to valuable resources and legitimacy (Hillman, Withers, 
& Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As such, this dissertation research seeks to 
examine the role of board members in helping their firms to appropriately position 
themselves to avoid various types of industry traps, some of which are identified as 
“bubbles” in which firms or other market actors overinvest in and overvalue particular 
products, resources or companies.  
Prior research has shown that directors, for instance through their memberships on 
other company boards, serve as a source of information and firm practices that can be 
transferred from one firm to another (Shropshire, 2010). Thus, board members and their 
accumulated knowledge, experience and relationships often can play a key role in the 
convergence of multiple firms on particular practices that result in bubbles. The 
5 
overlapping experiences of key decision-makers in the industry can result in conformity 
to industry recipes (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Spender, 1989; Sundaramurthy, 
Pukthuanthong, & Kor, 2014) or spread of practices due to isomorphic tendencies (Fiss, 
Kennedy, & Davis, 2012). The practice of board members allowing or encouraging their 
company to imitate other firms can produce “excessive investment that is focused too 
narrowly on a limited number of options, with poor profit outcomes for the majority of 
firms. Imitation is a natural response to environmental uncertainty, but, by reducing 
variety, it can compound the collective risk of firms in an industry” (Lieberman & Asaba, 
2006: 367). 
Accordingly, extant research has increasingly examined board capital, the 
combined human capital and social capital of board members (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Thus far, research has established that board capital affects a number of firm outcomes, 
including strategic change (Haynes & Hillman, 2010), the innovative performance of 
small firms (Wincent, Anokhin, & Örtqvist, 2010), and stock market reactions to board 
decisions (Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011). Most foundational research implicitly 
assumes that higher levels of human and social capital at the board level are universally 
desirable. However, recent research proposed that the level of overall resource availability 
in the environment may instead moderate the benefits of certain dimensions of board 
capital (Zona, Gomez-Mejia, & Withers, 2015). Indeed, “our understanding of when board 
composition is more or less consequential has been limited” (Almondoz & Tilcsik, in 
press: 35) and scholars have suggested that expertise can even be harmful under certain 
circumstances (Almandoz & Tilcsik, in press). 
6 
Drawing on prior research suggesting that board capital varies according to depth 
(concentration) and breadth (diversity) in regard to industry and functional expertise, I 
consider the potential for environmental shock to alter the relationship between the 
dimensions of board capital and a firm’s performance. Rapidly-changing environments 
are characterized by uncertainty (Buchko, 1994), disruption as new technologies are 
introduced (Adner, 2002) and market turbulence in which competitive interactions are 
difficult to predict (Bogner & Barr, 2000). Further, these types of environments may result 
in greater scarcity of resources for firms which, among other effects, has been shown to 
heighten the benefit of board interlocks (Zona et al., 2015). Recently, in their examination 
of biotechnology IPOs, Sundaramurthy and colleagues (2014) show that the industry-
backgrounds of board members can either be advantageous or disadvantageous depending 
on firm characteristics or interaction of their backgrounds with the CEO’s own capital. 
Similarly, this research will add to our knowledge of when generally desired board 
member experiences can instead be a liability (Almandoz & Tilcsik, in press) depending 
upon the environmental context. However, in contrast to prior work on the liability of 
expertise, when an industry is highly-complex, broad general business experience may be 
less transferable, while particular relevant expertise may be valuable, even when not 
gained within the industry. I consider when such expertise may be most beneficial. 
Using evidence from the context of the Financial Crisis of 2008, I introduce the 
concept of “board fit,” the extent to which board capital is effective in a particular 
environment. This echoes what Pfeffer and Salancik noted, “The criticality of a resource 
for an organization may vary from time to time as conditions in the organization’s 
7 
environment change” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 46). This concept extends the argument 
that strategic context is a significant moderator of the relationship between the relational 
capital of the board and firm outcomes (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Board fit as 
applicable to the 2008 crisis parallels the concept of “dynamic strategic fit” – the 
expectation that environmental and organizational factors influence subsequent changes 
in firm strategy and performance, proposed using the context of the U.S. Savings and Loan 
Crisis of the 1980s (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000). Like these authors, I draw on 
contingency theory to explain how firms adapt to changing environmental conditions. 
Indeed, board fit is useful to explain why board capital is not universally beneficial, but 
rather may be dependent on environmental contingencies. Thus, this dissertation research 
extends work showing that certain types of board human and social capital (breadth versus 
depth) can be more beneficial than others. Further, by examining the board’s influence on 
the strategic positioning of the firm, I answer calls by board researchers to focus on the 
intermediate mechanisms by which boards influence firm performance (Desender et al., 
2013). 
Board Human and Social Capital 
The construct of board human capital encompasses multiple resources possessed 
by board members. Some important resources include variable education, knowledge, 
experience, expertise and reputation (Khanna, Jones, & Boivie, 2014). Strong board 
human capital is generally desired, and can contribute to competitive advantage. This may 
occur either by increasing their monitoring effectiveness, through the advice they provide 
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to management (Khanna et al., 2014), or by the decisions that board members make as a 
group, such as approving major strategic actions. However, as expertise rises, decision-
makers are known to have blind spots, possibly resulting from hubris, which may cause 
them to overlook the potential consequences of their competitors’ decisions (Zajac & 
Bazerman, 1991).  
Boards are composed of individuals and thus affected by cognitive biases that 
include poor framing of information (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998) and seemingly 
irrational decisions (Ariely, 2009). Psychological explanations for the financial crisis have 
indeed been posed based on such explanations (Shefrin, 2010), or on individual 
motivations such as greed, which may be why CEOs directed their firms to make loans 
that had a high probability of never being paid back (Haynes, Campbell, & Hitt, 2015). 
For board members, other demands on their time and cognitive capacity may reduce their 
contribution to the board (Khanna et al., 2014). However, individual board members are 
also part of a group or a team (He & Huang, 2011) and thus group attributes and processes 
affect how their human capital is incorporated into firm decision-making. For instance, 
research on the benefits of board diversity suggest that boards are subject to bias if 
members are too demographically similar (Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014), a 
finding reminiscent of older theories of “groupthink” (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, 
& Schulz-Hardt, 2007). Yet, other research suggests that board diversity may also inhibit 
the firm from pursuing strategic change (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). 
Both board members’ depth and breadth are of great importance to the composition 
of the board. Human capital depth is the extent to which the board’s collective knowledge 
9 
and experience are concentrated, for instance in the industry of focus or a particular 
functional expertise. Human capital breadth is the extent to which a board’s collective 
knowledge and experience are diverse or span a wide range of industries or functional 
backgrounds. These “business experts” are thus able to draw on knowledge gained in other 
firms and industries to “supply alternative viewpoints on internal issues, providing 
executives with valuable information about how other firms deal with similar problems 
and concerns” (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000: 241). 
Depth and domain expertise (Almondoz & Tilcsik, in press) can contribute to 
strong performance during optimal conditions, but it is unclear from prior research 
whether depth or breadth is more valuable in helping a firm to avoid the consequences of 
overexposure when the environment shifts. Certainly board human capital depth is 
believed to be beneficial when the firm is operating under favorable environmental 
conditions and can capitalize on industry-specific knowledge to outperform competitors. 
Yet, this expertise can potentially lead to a type of industry entrenchment and acceptance 
of “industry recipes” (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Spender, 1989) that could 
potentially be detrimental during times of environmental shock. On the one hand, breadth 
of human capital might help a firm consider more alternatives and alter its strategy but on 
the other, this breadth might result in paralysis and inaction. 
Board social capital (also referred to as relational capital) primarily describes the 
potential benefits to a firm resulting from the networks to which its board members belong. 
This is the board-level equivalent of individual social capital and can enable the board to 
achieve certain, particular actions because of the way in which board members are linked 
  
10 
 
into social structures (Coleman, 1988). Board social capital can be conceptualized both as 
a unit-level aggregate of that possessed by individual board members (Ployhart, Reilly, & 
Maltarich, 2014) and as a “collective ability to access information and resource networks” 
(Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009: 984).  While many of the benefits available to the firm 
come from access to the external connection of board members, social capital can also be 
built up within the board, between the board and executives or other employees of the 
firm, and between the board and other stakeholders.  
A board embedded with depth (concentration in a certain dimension) of social 
capital can be helpful for increasing market share and profits when industry conditions are 
favorable. As others have noted, “Research on the embeddedness of the board in the focal 
firm’s industry is scarcer, yet, depth is a relevant and important component of board 
capital” (Haynes & Hillman, 2010: 1147).  A board with breadth (diversity in a certain 
dimension) of social capital can conversely allow organizations to selectively capitalize 
on alternate or contrary information. For instance, a financial firm with access to contrary 
information in the lead-up to a financial crisis may be more likely to avoid high risk 
positions in “toxic assets” – such as collateralized debt obligations – or be more likely to 
promptly reduce its exposure to these positions as new information becomes available. As 
described by Haynes & Hillman (2010: 1145): 
Access to more or better information through a variety of industry ties 
enables the firm to lessen the impact of uncertainty originating in its immediate 
industry environment. In other words, a firm whose board members have multiple 
ties to the firm’s main industry is better equipped to survive and thrive because it 
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can more quickly understand industry events and trends… A board with directors 
deeply embedded in industry through occupation and industry ties is likely to 
devise or approve strategies that converge to industry central tendencies. 
However, it is also possible that outsiders, even those possessing valuable information, 
may be more likely to defer to industry insiders during periods of turbulence or shock. 
Board Capital Depth versus Breadth 
Board capital combines both board human capital and social capital. Like top 
management teams with overlapping backgrounds (Westphal & Zajac, 1995, 1997), board 
members are likely to take actions based on relatively similar philosophies and 
underweight the advice and ideas of those who approach problems from a different 
perspective or provide suggestions perceived as contrarian in nature. Thus, a board’s 
composition and its board capital breadth and depth are likely to influence whether the 
firm falls into the potential trap of – and suffers the consequences of – industry-wide 
thinking. This tendency could also be described as industry group-think, industry logic, or 
excessive isomorphism. 
The purpose of this study is, through empirical research, to provide powerful and 
timely evidence of the respective roles board capital breadth and depth play during times 
of environmental shock. The mechanisms through which a board member exerts influence 
include, for instance, level and effectiveness of both monitoring activity, an important 
board function central to predictions of agency theory, and resource-provision, a function 
central to resource dependence theory. Ultimately, environmental disruption alters the 
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scarcity of resources and potentially changes the extent to which board composition and 
function are critical to firm performance. 
To test these predictions, I examined firm performance under varying economic 
conditions and formulated an integrated set of theoretical arguments based in resource 
dependence and contingency theories. In this way, I sought to understand the differing 
performance of some firms when assessed across the economic cycle and the role that a 
board can play in that positioning and performance. 
More specifically, I sought to answer the following research questions: 
- How does resource scarcity affect when strategic conformity is most harmful 
to a firm’s performance? 
- How do board human and social capital depth and breadth influence a firm’s 
susceptibility to environmental shock? 
- Does a particular type of board composition allow a firm to outperform peers 
during times of disruption? 
By answering these questions within the context of one of the most perplexing systemic 
failures observed in the capitalist system, this dissertation provides several unique 
theoretical contributions. 
First, despite its intuitive appeal, research has repeatedly failed to identify strong 
evidence of general board capital; studies tend to indicate weak or no effects (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). This dissertation suggests that a more nuanced 
approach may be required, because a board’s influence may be partially contingent on the 
presence of certain environmental conditions, notably, as in this case, the presence of a 
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crisis that may heighten the opportunity for board influence. Accordingly, I integrate 
previously disparate research on board capital and contingency theory. Certainly the role 
of board capital in helping a firm deal with environmental disruption is of significant 
importance because board influence may be most salient during times when firm 
performance is at risk. For instance, research has shown that board members are more 
engaged when they have concerns regarding management’s ability to carry out 
restructuring activity (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993) and when the firm is in crisis 
(Withers, Corley, et al., 2012). As a result, the past experience of new directors affects 
whether management and other directors will perceive their contributions to be relevant 
to current strategic conditions (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Thus, seeking a more 
nuanced understanding of the relevance of different dimensions of board capital in certain 
circumstances, I respond to Haynes and Hillman (2010: 1159), who indicate the need for 
“further research models that continue to refine when board diversity can be good and 
when it can be bad”. Consequently, I build on even more recent research which has found 
that domain expertise can at times be associated with firm failure (Almandoz & Tilcsik, 
in press). 
Second, this dissertation research contributes to the literature by addressing 
whether strategic conformity is more or less valuable during a crisis, a question on which 
institutional theory and the strategic management literature offer seemingly different 
prescriptions. The probability of firm survival may increase for firms that diverge from 
strategic norms due to their ability to access and decipher information from a broader 
variety of board relationships. However, prior to a crisis, these firms may at times appear 
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to be underperforming, as the value of their superior positioning may not be immediately 
reflected in market assessments that are biased by the majority view. This dissertation 
seeks to integrate the potentially conflicting research and delineate under which 
environmental circumstances legitimacy-seeking versus differentiating strategies may be 
most successful. 
Third, I draw on resource dependence theory to explain why board capital breadth 
and depth influence firm outcomes across different environmental conditions. It is worth 
noting that while a significant portion of the corporate governance literature draws on 
agency theory, agency explanations are incomplete for explaining the role of boards in 
times of firm failure. Certainly, in the context of the financial crisis, agency theory is 
useful in exploring why executives’ interests or individual traders’ interests are divorced 
from those of shareholders and society, resulting in the taking of outsized risks. However, 
to a large extent, board members are notably among the “coalition participants” who prefer 
to benefit from the “continued existence of the organization” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 
47). Indeed, some have suggested that agency explanations for board influence may be 
more relevant when resources are more abundant (Zona et al., 2015). In contrast, when 
resources are scarce, agency concerns may be less relevant because the scarcity of 
resources can serve to align the interests of board members, executives, and shareholders 
to focus on ensuring the firm’s continuity. Therefore, resource dependence theory is 
valuable in understanding the role of board members in positioning their firms within the 
marketplace and reacting to changes in environmental conditions. However, corporate 
governance research drawing on resource dependence theory has to date focused on the 
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overall value of board capital, rarely examining the dynamic environmental conditions 
that continuously alter which attributes of board capital will be beneficial.  
I therefore extend resource dependence theory by showing that resource provision 
and optimization are dependent on context. Hillman and colleagues (Hillman et al., 2000: 
252) found that firms “strategically alter the composition of their boards in response to 
new environmental demands and forces.” Resources that are beneficial in one context may 
be harmful in another, and high-performing firms will either be the most adept at selecting 
board members who can provide resources relevant to the expected conditions or more 
agile in changing the directors on their board to match the operating environment, perhaps 
aided by shorter board terms. While past work has indeed substantiated expectations that 
firms alter board composition in response to changes in the external environment (Hillman 
et al., 2000), such alterations have often been in response to predictable and announced 
environmental changes such as deregulation or to more recurring changes in the 
institutional environment (Peng, 2004) as opposed to disruption characterized as an 
environmental shock which creates even greater uncertainty. Economic shocks, in 
particular, result in capital constraints and changes in demand for a firm’s products 
(Chakrabarti, 2015). 
This dissertation suggests that when the risk of crisis is significant, firms should 
seek to strengthen their board by selecting directors who augment board capital 
appropriately, whether that capital is obtained from within or outside the industry. In 
essence, firms whose board capital is not optimal may experience reduced monitoring and 
resource provision, potentially contributing to the firm making short-sighted decisions, 
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such as zealously competing for market share even when the costs of this pursuit exceed 
the benefit, and ultimately underperforming over a longer time horizon. Accordingly, 
firms should actively seek access to directors who have the necessary characteristics to 
appropriately monitor the CEO.  
Second, firms should employ deliberate strategies to reduce the likelihood of 
falling into industry-wide traps and to position themselves to profit during times of 
industry disruption. Thus, I answer in part a call to determine if “such variances in crisis 
situations and diversified environments can further enrich our understanding of the value 
of diversity of experience between the executive and the monitoring arms of the board” 
(Sundaramurthy et al., 2014: 865). Firms that alter governance mechanisms to increase 
board fit in accordance with the more constrained resource environment may also out-
perform less responsive peers.  
Third, while emerging research examines when resource dependency and agency 
theories are most relevant to explaining the role of boards in firm decision-making (Zona 
et al., 2015), to date, the board capital literature has not articulated a theoretical basis for 
mechanisms that explain which theoretical lens best illuminates a relationship between 
board roles and firm performance. I suggest that the dimensions of board capital are 
differentially associated with particular board functions, an area which Kor and 
Sundaramurthy (2009) noted would benefit from a theoretical articulation of how different 
types of director capital improve the performance of specific functions. Specifically, I 
argue, board capital depth increases the monitoring capabilities of the board and can 
thereby contribute to improved firm performance. Alternatively, relevant expertise from 
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outside the industry can allow board members to simultaneously be effective monitors 
while also increasing the firm’s access to resources and thereby can contribute to improved 
firm performance. Environmental conditions, notably affecting resource availability, 
moderate these relationships and thereby determine which theoretical explanations are 
most salient in predicting firm performance.  
Finally, I also make a secondary contribution to agency theory, which suggests 
that boards should represent owners in their decision-making. However, board members 
may have motivations that differ from those of principals, including a desire for 
entrenchment, reputational concerns, and misaligned financial incentives (Withers, 
Corley, & Hillman, 2012). Thus, I seek to examine when heterogeneous boards will make 
more optimal decisions on behalf of their firms. Further, I seek to contribute to an 
understanding of when depth of board capital may be advantageous by addressing the 
implications of the board capital-performance relationship, notably during periods of 
crisis, as called for by board capital researchers (Haynes & Hillman, 2010). 
As described in Chapter IV, the sample identified from BoardEx consists of 348 
banks that operated in the financial sector from 2005-2013 and were subject to filing 
requirements with the Federal Reserve, as well as approximately 7,000 directors that 
served on at least one of their boards for one or more years. These dates include time prior 
to the Financial Crisis, as well as time after the crisis subsided. I aggregated board and 
firm information from BoardEx and Compustat, respectively, to create distinct models to 
test the effect of board capital breadth and depth on strategic conformity, changes in board 
composition, and financial performance. I augmented this empirical approach with 
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exploratory, phenomenological interviews with industry participants and experts as 
detailed in Chapter VI. These interviews allowed for a more comprehensive consideration 
of the influences and perceptions that affected key decision-makers and the exchanges that 
occurred between executives and board members. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. First, I provide a review of the literature on 
strategic conformity and draw on theory to propose firm-level hypotheses in Chapter II. 
Then, in Chapter III, I develop hypotheses by drawing on theoretical frameworks and 
relevant board capital literature, specifically that examine the role of depth and breadth 
capital in board performance and thereby firm outcomes. In each of these chapters, I 
introduce the contextual factor of environmental shock which may alter the conformity-
performance relationship and similarly may alter the role and influence of the board. 
Chapter IV details the methodology used to test each aspect of the model, while Chapter 
V provides a comprehensive discussion of the results. Chapter VI discusses key insights 
from the interviews. In conclusion, Chapter VII details the contributions this dissertation 
makes in advancing theory and providing a basis for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
STRATEGIC CONFORMITY 
Firms should be as different as legitimately possible. 
(Deephouse, 1999: 147) 
Institutional theory details the many coercive and mimetic forces facing firms. 
Accordingly, organizations often adopt similar practices and approaches on everything 
from golden parachutes for CEOs (Fiss, Kennedy, & Davis, 2002) to the structure and 
titles of the top management team (Zorn, 2004). 
Organizations also have the opportunity to mimic the actions of others in the 
resources they control and the competitive actions they conduct. Simply, strategic 
conformity is the extent to which a firm’s strategies are similar to those of peer firms 
(Deephouse, 1996). Firms whose resource profile or strategic actions are consistent with 
those of other firms can be described to be strategically conforming, while firms whose 
resources or strategic actions are unique can be described as strategically deviating. 
Strategic conformity can be used as an intermediate dependent variable that is affected by 
board and CEO characteristics and as a predictor of firm performance. This section 
provides a review of the past literature on organizational conformity. Notably, providing 
such a review is a difficult task at times, as scholars also express significant interest in the 
initiation of strategic and organizational change (e.g., Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). 
While initiation of organizational change may have many of the same antecedents as 
organizational deviation, their rationale and outcomes may differ. At times, these studies 
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are informative in understanding organizational conformity. However, at other times, 
because a firm can initiate numerous changes but still remain in lock-step with peers and 
competitors, these studies may hinder an understanding of unexplored and unknown 
relationships. For instance, a firm can choose a number of different courses of action that 
vary on three dimensions: whether to change (the company could choose to not change 
even when peers are changing or could choose to change when peers are not changing), 
direction of change, and magnitude of change (change more than peers or change less than 
peers). 
Similarly, the literature on imitation is also highly-related to that considering 
strategic conformity. To some extent, conformity represents the cumulative effect of 
organizational imitation. Yet, it also stands apart, because when organizations are marked 
by conformity, specific initiation and subsequent responses may not be observable. 
Indeed, organizations may act in-sync with one another or gradually approach similar 
positioning. Ultimately, this may have been a contributing factor to the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission’s unflattering description of what occurred during the Financial 
Crisis: 
Financial institutions made, bought, and sold mortgage securities they 
never examined, did not care to examine, or knew to be defective; firms 
depended on tens of billions of dollars of borrowing that had to be renewed 
each and every night, secured by subprime mortgage securities; and major 
firms and investors blindly relied on credit rating agencies as their arbiters 
of risk. (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011: xvii) 
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Competing Views of Strategic Conformity 
Two distinct reasons motivate the discussion of organizational conformity in the 
literature. First, conformity is central to institutional theory as it represents acquiescence 
of an organization to various pressures. For instance, organizations seek to align 
themselves with generally accepted industry norms and practices in order to obtain 
resources. Second, the potential benefits of deliberately choosing not to conform but rather 
to deviate from the practices of other organizations are a key focus of strategic 
management scholars. For example, heterogeneity can create competitive advantages for 
the firm. These viewpoints clash in their fundamental expectation: is conformity or 
deviance beneficial to an organization?  
Institutional theory would broadly predict that conformity is beneficial to firms. 
Specifically, mimetic isomorphism has been used to explain how firms seek to be 
perceived as legitimate by following established strategies in line with those of key 
industry leaders. Indeed, these pressures result in the general expectation that 
“organizations embedded in the same environment, and thus subject to the same 
institutional pressures, tend to adopt similar practices” (Battilana & Casciaro, 2012: 382). 
These similar practices, and the applications of institutional theory, are wide in scope, 
affecting numerous firm decisions and practices. In this work, I focus on the specific 
groupings of actions that reflect a firm’s strategy. 
Following strategies similar to those of other firms provides a firm certain benefits. 
It avoids the risk of adopting technologies that the rest of the industry will ignore and 
avoids paying the high price required of early adopters (Dowell & Swaminathan, 2006). 
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Further, research on strategic groups suggests that being a core or central firm contributes 
to increased legitimacy and thereby numerous benefits, such as superior access to 
resources (McNamara, Deephouse, & Luce, 2003). Similarly, scholars have demonstrated 
that isomorphism contributes to favorable responses from regulators and media 
participants (Deephouse, 1996). While firms may demonstrate some degree of strategic 
choice in how they decide to conform, the pressure to conform remains strong even as an 
organization increases in size (Goodstein, 1994). When an organization does not fully 
comply with institutional pressures, it is likely to disguise its deviation through a variety 
of approaches so as to maintain legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). 
Strategic management scholarship also generally conveys an expectation that low 
conformity, or deviance, is a necessary condition to creating competitive advantage. 
Strategic conformity places a limit on the upside performance of the firm, because excess 
returns are not possible if the firm is acting in tandem with its peers. Breaking away from 
the status quo may be a key way to benefit from first-mover advantage or surprising 
competitors (Carpenter, 2000). For example, strategic management scholars examine the 
benefits of pioneering behaviors or pioneering orientation of firms, such as introducing 
new products before peers do (Mueller, Titus, Covin, & Slevin, 2012). Results suggest a 
“double-edged sword, variously serving to enable firm growth and threaten firm survival” 
(Mueller et al., 2012: 1543). Research in this area is also closely related to strategic change 
(Carpenter, 2000). For instance, recent work has sought to establish links between industry 
expertise and strategic change (Oehmichen, Schrapp, & Wolff, 2016). However, strategic 
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management scholars have also identified conditions under which strategic deviation is 
harmful, such as when the industry is characterized by uncertainty (Carpenter, 2000). 
Two related sets of literature on the matter are particularly important in assessing 
the benefits of conformity. First, a number of scholars have investigated adherence to 
“industry recipes” (Spender, 1989). These recipes represent shared belief systems and 
common cognitive mappings of the boundaries and approaches within an industry that 
serve to cause firms to accept them in a predictable fashion (Bogner & Barr, 2000). 
Similarly, many participants, regardless of their home firms, may share an industry 
mindset and contribute to an industry culture (Phillips, 1994). While these studies are not 
always explicitly linked to the strategic actions of firms, it follows that participants with 
these shared expectations and beliefs are more likely to take actions in accordance with 
this conventional wisdom. In contrast, scholars have also explored early adopters and first-
movers in a variety of contexts; these actions constitute a form of strategic deviation. A 
significant body of research has explored these effects in numerous contexts, ranging from 
acquisition waves (Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 2004; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 
2008) to international expansion (Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006). To the extent that 
existing firms undertake entry into new markets, the order of entry literature is also 
relevant (Shamsie, Phelps, & Kuperman, 2004). These literatures in combination 
contribute greater depth to the variety of factors that influence whether a strategic action 
is beneficial to a firm. However, they do not contribute to resolution as to whether a firm 
should definitely conform or deviate from its peers. 
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This impasse on the ultimate merits of conformity persists despite numerous 
valuable contributions to the literature. For instance, Deephouse (1999) proposed strategic 
balance as an integrative solution to the conundrum. Strategic balance examines both the 
conformity and differentiation propositions as paths to improved performance available to 
firms, as they represent distinct challenges in regard to competition and establishing 
legitimacy, respectively. While conformity may increase legitimacy, this legitimacy 
comes at the cost of competing in a market with a greater number of undifferentiated 
competitors and corresponds to lower profits (Deephouse, 1999). 
While this conclusion acknowledges the centrality of resources, specifically 
considering the reactions of exchange partners, greater incorporation of resource 
dependence theory can help to improve both our understanding of when organizations 
would be expected to conform to industry norms and when conformity as opposed to 
deviance is valuable in its implications for firm performance. For instance, to the extent 
firms have consistent strategies, these organizations are also dependent upon access to 
resources similar to those needed by competitors, potentially vie for the same set of 
customers, and compete for the same pool of employees. Thus, the factors affecting one 
firm may influence many firms and incorporating resource dependence theory allows for 
explanations that more fully integrate environmental factors and the role of key decision-
makers to account for heterogeneity of firm outcomes. 
First, environmental factors are paramount in determining when conformity is 
valuable. Zajac and colleagues (Zajac et al., 2000) articulate a model of dynamic strategic 
fit in which environmental and organizational contingencies affect the desirability of a 
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strategic change. The extent to which the strategic change that is adopted matches the 
optimal strategic change becomes the predictor of organizational performance; strategic 
change must be continuous in response to environmental cues and other factors. However, 
this model does not directly address the extent to which the strategic changes represent 
conformity or deviation relative to other competitors in the industry. Firm levels of 
conformity may follow a punctuated equilibrium model defaulting toward convergence 
until interrupted by periods of poor performance (Deephouse, 1999). 
Yet, few researchers have examined the value of conformity at a time of disruption. 
Indeed, studies that have sought to establish environmental effects on strategic change are 
often limited by a focus on comparing firms in one industry to another, rather than 
modeling a significant environmental disruption or change within an industry (e.g., 
Gordon, Stewart, Sweo, & Luker, 2000; Gordon et al., 2000). Because the key argument 
for conformity is primarily one of legitimacy, it is relevant to ask of more mature firms: 
when do a firm’s stakeholders expect it to establish or preserve legitimacy? Therefore, 
while poor performance of a particular firm may incite risk-taking, environmental shock 
may result in many firms pursuing legitimacy rather than a more risky strategy deviating 
from the norm. This is consistent with results showing that strategic deviation was not 
beneficial in industries characterized by uncertainty (Carpenter, 2000). In these contexts, 
it may be helpful to incorporate recent theoretical developments in regard to the legitimacy 
judgment cycle (Tost, 2011), which suggest that legitimacy judgments are reassessed to 
affect support and resistance to change. It similarly follows that willingness to deviate 
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from industry norms may not be a static preference, but rather is influenced by changes in 
the environment that may trigger legitimacy evaluations. 
In addition to environmental factors, the firm’s key decision-makers significantly 
influence strategic positioning. Therefore, the question shifts to: when will decision-
makers be most prone to undertake legitimacy-preserving actions? Recent research 
suggests that governance arrangements between management and ownership help 
determine the strategic conformity of the firm (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013). 
While Miller et al.’s study considered how family firms may have unique reasons for 
pursuing legitimacy through conformity, my sample allows me to examine how 
environmental factors may alter the decision-making pursued by the board and CEO of 
firms outside of the familial context. Recent empirical work has also suggested that 
individual attributes of the CEO – specifically affective traits – influence strategic 
conformity and performance (Delgado-Garcia & De la Fuente-Sabate, 2010). This was 
built on prior work examining the influence of the broader top management team’s tenure 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) and networks (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Further, 
evidence of the CEO’s involvement in strategic decision-making includes the effects of 
compensation and performance (Carpenter, 2000), which alter how CEOs choose to 
reposition their firms. Given this multiplicity of factors affecting strategic conformity, I 
propose a holistic model in which environmental, firm, board and top management 
characteristics each affect a firm’s degree of strategic conformity. Ultimately, the 
challenge for a firm is similar to that faced by individuals seeking both to retain self-
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identity as well as differentiation from others; hence the pursuit of optimal distinctiveness 
(Brewer, 1993). 
Firm Decision-Makers and Strategic Conformity 
In accordance with upper-echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; for reviews 
see Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004, Finkelstein et al., 2009), key decision-
makers –  notably the board of directors, the CEO, and the remainder of the top 
management team – play a role in affecting the strategic positioning of the firm and 
thereby the degree to which that strategy is similar to that of other competitors. 
Alternatively, these decision-makers can serve as the mechanism through which 
dissemination of practices occurs, as they respond to outside influences (Fiss et al., 2012). 
The decision-makers of greatest interest include the board of directors, the CEO, and the 
remainder of the top-management team. Each of these parties plays a distinct role in the 
governance of the firm and can affect its strategic positioning in unique ways. For all roles, 
there is conflicting logic as to whether the decision-maker is inclined to prefer strategic 
deviation or strategic conformity. On the one hand, staying close to the status quo reduces 
concern that the decision-maker will be faulted for having made any egregious errors in 
judgment, and therefore, criticism may be muted. On the other hand, to the extent that 
observing the status quo minimizes the opportunity for out-performance, decision-makers’ 
continuance in the role may be threatened by failure to exceed expected benchmarks for 
performance. Thus, individual perceptions of their role and risk preferences are likely to 
affect the ultimate decision. Indeed, their roles may interact with one another in either a 
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substitute or complementary manner (Daily & Schwenk, 1996). The next section provides 
a review of the literature on each of these parties in regard to how they may affect strategic 
conformity, including specifically addressing their response in the face of environmental 
shock. 
The Board of Directors and Strategic Conformity 
The board of directors at most firms is expected to, among other roles, oversee 
major strategic decisions. This may at times include providing information or other types 
of resources to the top management team to assist them in the execution of certain strategic 
actions. Notably, director experience has been associated with improved firm outcomes 
following significant acquisitions (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). Similarly, board 
members’ expertise with environmental issues has been shown to improve the firm’s 
environmental performance (de Villiers, Naiker, & van Staden, 2011).  
While these experiences or other resources may be beneficial to the directors’ firm, 
they are also likely to become conduits or standard industry practices. These past 
experiences also connect directors to particular networks of individuals. As a result, 
directors have been shown to facilitate the diffusion of practices across organizations 
(Haunschild, 1993). 
In conjunction with a director’s experiences and networks that might serve to relay 
norms, a director’s duties and incentives further augment the likelihood that she will 
contribute to conformity. Directors have a legal responsibility to act in the interest of 
shareholders, though some states’ legal precedents may allow them to also consider other 
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stakeholders. Thus, the potential threat of legal liability may cause a director to prefer 
courses of action that are least questionable and most defensible in line with the 
recommendations that would be made by a prudent decision-maker. For each of these 
reasons, board members possessing significant industry-specific knowledge and tenure on 
the board are expected to think and act like other players within the industry. Thus, 
directors would be less likely to default to industry-defying strategic actions. However, 
having experiences in other industries and broader networks may alter what a director 
considers as a reasonable or prudent recommendation. Further, directors tend to vastly 
overestimate the actual risk of being held liable for their role in poor decisions (Black, 
Cheffins, & Klausner, 2006). This overestimation means that the potential risk is weighted 
heavily in a director’s decision-making.  
In addition to this legal expectation, directors are often motivated by preserving or 
enhancing their own reputations (Yermack, 2004). Directors who value the opportunity to 
serve on both the current board and additional boards in the future are more likely to act 
in line with norms within the industry, because deviation is more likely to be punished.  
Finally, the effects of director biases for or against strategic actions are likely to 
be outsized due to group decision-making processes. In a recent study, the acquisition 
premium recommended by a board was shown to be much higher or much lower than the 
premiums with which individual directors had been associated in the past (Zhu, 2013). 
When directors deliberate as a group, they are likely to draw on their past experiences, and 
similar past experiences of other directors may reinforce their beliefs (Zhu, 2013). Thus, 
having even a few members from within the industry may serve to reinforce beliefs 
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common in the industry and make it difficult for outsiders to alter the trajectory of the 
firm.   
The CEO and Strategic Conformity 
In the vast majority of firms, no other single individual has as much influence over 
its strategic direction as the CEO. As a result, numerous attributes of the CEO may affect 
strategic conformity. One emergent area of research seeks to connect a CEO’s personality 
traits to particular strategic actions and their implementation (Herrmann & Nadkarni, 
2014). These authors found that emotional stability and extraversion increased the 
likelihood that a CEO would initiate change effectively improving firm performance 
resulting from strategic change (Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014). These findings were also 
helpful in delineating that change requires both the decision to embark on a new course as 
well as the operational implementation of that choice.   
The attitudes and preferences of the CEO are in turn affected by other factors. One 
recent model introduces the construct of CEO commitment to the status quo and 
incorporates firm, industry and CEO attributes to predict commitment to the status quo, 
and thereby an effect on future firm performance (McClelland, Liang, & Barker, 2010). 
In a sense, strategic conformity may be an important mediator of this relationship, for the 
primary mechanism through which a CEO can affect firm performance is in the strategic 
positioning of the firm. Further, a number of additional environmental characteristics may 
be pertinent. Thus, the proposed model and dissertation research extend and expand on 
this prior work.  
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The CEO’s risk preferences are also important to examine. If the CEO pursues 
strategic conformity, the firm’s performance will perhaps be similar to that of competitors 
(e.g., close to industry average), and, therefore draw fewer criticisms from industry 
observers, shareholders and other stakeholders, though they may still clamor for actions 
to improve performance. In essence, this reduces the idiosyncratic risks that the CEO must 
absorb if he or she pursues a unique strategy that fails. Beyond individual differences, 
governance mechanisms such as compensation practices within the firm may influence 
the CEO’s preferences regarding strategic conformity. In one relevant study, CEO 
compensation was shown to be highest when firms exhibited higher levels of strategic 
change rather than persistence (Grossman & Cannella, 2006). 
The Top Management Team and Strategic Conformity 
Other members of the top management team (TMT) have the opportunity to 
significantly influence firm behaviors, both in their own managerial capacity and in the 
information and advice they provide to the CEO. Indeed, the individual characteristics of 
TMTs have been shown to affect a number of firm actions. For instance, the political 
orientation of the TMT has been demonstrated to alter a firm’s observed tax avoidance 
(Carpenter, 2000), which can be interpreted as important evidence of how risk preferences 
can affect the actions of the firm. Consequently, without direction and monitoring from 
the CEO and the board, top management teams generally are expected to advocate and 
pursue strategic conformity for the firm. This is evidenced by several empirical findings. 
First, the greater the amount of managerial discretion in an industry, the stronger is the 
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relationship between top management team tenure and strategic conformity (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1990). Second, results on the association between CEO compensation and 
strategic persistence suggest that the TMT, as insiders, may feel some degree of ownership 
of strategies already in place (Grossman & Cannella, 2006). Third, managers naturally 
gravitate toward simplicity and reduce their search for new options as they hone in on 
what has been successful for them in the past (Miller & Chen, 1996). In combination, 
TMTs that have longer tenure and lower risk preferences are likely to desire to satisfy 
industry norms such that the longer executives are with the firm, the less of an outside 
perspective they contribute. Consequently, they “gradually tend to make fewer strategic 
changes, to imitate or match strategic tendencies of the industry, and, accordingly, to be 
associated with firm performance that rises and falls in line with industry fortune” 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990: 499). 
However, in certain circumstances, members of the TMT may be advocates for 
strategic deviation. First, heterogeneity of functional backgrounds increases the likelihood 
of strategic change (Gordon et al., 2000) and, in turn, a greater opportunity for the firm to 
move away from the practices of competitors. Second, if executives have strong personal 
expectations of returning to a prior or entering a different industry, they may be less 
inclined to ensure that the firm pursues conformity. In this case, they may seek to establish 
a reputation for themselves or follow a non-conforming approach. Indeed, this may to 
some extent be endogenous: the executive may have been hired by the CEO for the 
expressed purpose of drawing on experience in another industry and be given free rein to 
act on their knowledge gained from that experience.  Finally, as participants in a 
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tournament, executives least likely to be named CEO may pursue higher-risk strategies in 
order to increase their odds of outperforming others, while executives most strongly 
positioned for internal promotion may feel the highest need to comply with established 
standards. 
Indicators and Measurement of Strategic Conformity 
While these decision-makers have significant influence in adopting and 
implementing the firm’s strategies, their decisions are indisputably affected by a number 
of formal and informal institutional forces. Five particular groups are mechanisms by 
which industry norms and expected strategies are likely conveyed between firms: 
regulators, trade and professional bodies, investors (particularly institutional), employees 
and consumers. 
To the extent that firms can be expected to mimic the strategies of others, it is 
important to determine how these strategic choices are manifest in firm behaviors. 
Appendix B-1 provides a categorization of strategic indicators along with proposed 
corresponding measurements. Each strategic indicator can serve as an input to calculate 
an industry norm and subsequent variance from that norm by an individual firm. Scholars 
have primarily used measures of resource deployment whether across functions or based 
on asset allocations, but have also utilized various indicators of corporate strategy and 
product-level indicators of imitation and mimicry. Note that at times these may represent 
tactical rather than strategic moves by the firm. 
34 
Scholars typically examine strategic conformity by defining a particular industry 
and comparing the focal firm’s financial ratios to the respective industry means or median 
(see Appendix B-1 for examples). Indeed these would largely tend to mirror “industry-
specific measures based on the need to assess both the scope and resource deployment 
facets of strategy” (Mehra & Floyd, 1998:514). However, this approach is becoming 
increasingly impractical for future research. Firms increasingly have defined their 
competition in a macro, cross-industry fashion; that is, their primary competitors may not 
always be members of the same industrial classification. For instance, Apple (SIC 3571 
and 7372) and Google (SIC 7370) may perceive Facebook (SIC 2741) and Tesla (SIC 
3711) as important competitors. In Google’s 2015 Proxy Statement, the company 
identifies thirteen peer companies ranging from Amazon.com to The Walt Disney 
Company. Like most publicly listed companies, Google relies on a combination of 
industry, performance, and size conditions, as well as firms perceived to be competitors 
for key talent. While the primary purpose of this peer group is to determine executive 
compensation, it also frequently affects assessment of performance. Thus, historic 
measurements of conformity and deviance may be useful in determining competitive 
advantage of the firm or stakeholder acceptance; they may, however, be of limited value 
in understanding the comparisons used by firm executives and board members when 
making strategic choices. As a firm grows and diversifies, benchmarks for individual 
business lines are increasingly developed at a divisional rather than firm level, yet these 
data are very difficult to obtain as these granular disclosures are not mandated by 
regulators. Accordingly, scholars rarely are able to obtain data at this level of analysis. 
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The benefits of strategic conformity are highly context-specific. Scholars to some degree 
account for this by including resource munificence as a control variable. However, this is 
insufficient as it does not allow for potential interactive effects. Instead, using an 
environmental context can show when strategic conformity is valuable. 
A configuration approach may be necessary to understand how a firm’s conformity 
and deviance can differ across several dimensions. Indeed, this configuration rather than 
the absolute conformity may be informative. For instance, Southwest Airlines can exhibit 
significant strategic deviations from other airlines in its customer service, firm culture, 
and route selection. Yet, it can still have similar targets and financial metrics on numerous 
other dimensions, including a mix of business/personal travelers, pilot compensation, and 
value of the aircraft portfolio. Many measurements of strategic conformity would have 
potentially missed Southwest’s decision to hedge its fuel purchases, which ultimately 
served as a key source of high performance in comparison to its peers. A similar concern 
was first raised by Deephouse (1999) who suggested that firm balance can supersede the 
importance of strategic balance. In light of this review of strategic conformity, I develop 
specific hypotheses as to how environmental disruption alters the relationship between 
strategic conformity and performance, dependent upon whether the industry environment 
is subject to a significant economic shock. 
Crisis, Strategic Conformity and Firm Performance 
Firms likely achieve certain legitimacy benefits from strategic positions that are 
similar to peers. However, total conformity limits the firm’s ability to generate competitive 
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advantage, because, at best, conformity would lead to competitive parity. If strategies are 
highly similar, the firm must differentiate itself by superior execution. In contrast, if a firm 
has low strategic conformity, diverging from industry expectations, it may suffer from 
lower legitimacy and be penalized by various parties including employees, customers, and 
investors. In combination over the entirety of a business cycle including when the industry 
performance is high and when it is low, these competing theoretical frames may offset one 
another. In other words, both extreme conformity and extreme divergence carry their own 
risks. 
Some firms’ performance will be closely tied to the level of industry performance, 
particularly those which have adopted a strategy that is close to the mean or median 
strategy in the industry. As a result, when the industry is performing well, they can expect 
to benefit. When the industry suffers a downturn, they can expect to experience lower 
performance. Thus, their performance volatility is tied to industry fortunes, albeit their 
execution of the strategy can still distinguish them from other similarly conforming peers. 
However, what is perhaps more interesting is to consider this from a different perspective. 
Generally, low strategic conformity is likely associated with higher risk; that is, the risks 
and potential payoff are higher for these firms. Nonetheless, the divergence of the firm’s 
fortunes from those of the industry should also be factored into the risk equation. Firms 
with low performance likely fail to obtain some of the benefits that competitors at the core 
of the industry receive. In turn, they are less likely to be fully exposed when the downturn 
occurs. On average, the peaks are lower and the troughs more shallow than for conforming 
firms. 
37 
Hypothesis 1: Conforming firms have higher variation in performance than 
deviating firms.  
Contingency theory indicates that organizational performance is highest when the 
there is a fit between the organization’s characteristics, such as structure and strategy, and 
the situation at hand (Donaldson, 2001). The economic environment is a critical 
contingency that may alter the success of particular strategies. 
Firms that survive within an industry may have achieved success via a number of 
different strategies; however, when an industry is performing well, the pressure to conform 
increases. Investments that deviate from those of competitors can result in poor 
performance, unless carefully orchestrated (Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). To improve their own 
performance, firms begin to mimic the strategies of successful competitors, attempting to 
fit with the prevailing economic and competitive conditions. Anecdotally, many banks 
initially had little exposure to collateralized debt obligations. As profits on these products 
enabled other banks to achieve strong performance, the remaining banks adopted 
increased exposure to such products. Failure to join the trend could mean that a bank’s 
performance would significantly lag behind that of its peers. Thus, a firm may experience 
pressure to conform from numerous formal and informal institutions, particularly from 
investors. Employees may also be motivated to propose changes based on actions they 
perceive being taken by rival firms. To some degree, the success of the industry should 
result in the increased availability of financial resources. Still, the level of growth thus 
contributes to an increased level of strategic conformity among firms so financial 
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resources may be deployed in the same manner, even driving up the cost of pursuing the 
mutually desired end resources, such as human or physical capital. 
Environmental disruption frequently triggers a strategic response from firms. 
While some participants or decision-makers may react in accordance with a threat-rigidity 
hypothesis, that is with no response (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), numerous others 
will believe that action is superior to inaction and seek to adjust the firm’s strategies to 
match the changed environment. Further, in addition to this motivation, the crisis provides 
rationale that can be used to justify the need for action to the institutions that normally 
contribute to institutional isomorphism. Stakeholders are unlikely to have consistent 
expectations as to how a firm should react when the entire industry is in crisis. As a result, 
firms may react very differently to the disruption and the variance in resource conditions 
each firm experiences will likely influence its strategic responses. Some may sense an 
opportunity to acquire undervalued assets; in the financial sector that possibility may 
include entire portfolios or firms. Others may believe it is necessary to rapidly reduce 
exposure to the problem portfolios or products. Some may be suddenly short on financial 
resources and therefore sell off “non-core” businesses. The variety of responses available 
without a clear consistent framework for which response will be most beneficial, results 
in significant divergence. 
Despite the tendency for firms in general to decrease their level of strategic 
conformity during times of environmental shock, the shock is likely to result in increased 
scrutiny and a lower supply of resources to the industry. The legitimacy of all firms may 
be somewhat tainted by the crisis and many parties may react with heightened skepticism. 
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Certain resources may be in abundance (i.e., laid off workers), yet the supply of new 
resources (i.e., new talent), and in particular financial capital, often declines rapidly. Firms 
employing strategies seen as risky or unconventional may be less likely to receive support 
from stakeholders. These types of stakeholders exert significant pressure on firms 
(Aguilera et al., 2015). Thus, firms may potentially benefit by signaling their conformity 
and stability. For instance, bubbles may contribute to investment in many niche areas that 
may not survive the disruption. Accordingly, stakeholders may wish for firms to send a 
signal that they are “returning to the basics” or the core of the industry, and thereby provide 
a safe haven for investors. This expectation is supported by previous findings which 
demonstrated that environmental instability was associated with firms reducing their level 
of diversification and simplifying firm structure (Keats & Hitt, 1988). In essence, 
managers seem to seek to reduce uncertainty on dimensions which they can control when 
operating in volatile environments. 
However, this may be the most opportune time for firms with resources to obtain 
desirable positions. While many firms scramble to reestablish legitimacy, a valuable 
differentiating strategy may be to obtain human capital and other resources. Indeed, firms 
who practice countercyclical hiring, augmenting their workforces during an economic 
downturn, are more profitable than their competitors (Greer & Ireland, 1992). While other 
firms are experiencing pressure to choose a strategy in line with the norm of the industry, 
the returns available for firms on the fringe or carving their own path may increase. To 
achieve optimal performance, firms must respond to the changing environment and 
optimize their strategy accordingly. Thus, I expect: 
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Hypothesis 2: Crisis moderates the relationship between conformity and 
performance such that deviation is more valuable in times of crisis than in other 
environmental conditions. 
Having considered strategic conformity at the firm level, the next chapter provides 
a more complete discussion and examination of the responses of the board that, as 
indicated above, have the potential to play a substantial role in monitoring and providing 
resources to the firm. Drawing on prior work and building theory about board reactions, 
the next chapter develops a set of hypotheses related to the board and when its composition 
may be valuable to the firm. 
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CHAPTER III 
BOARDS AND GOVERNANCE DURING CRISIS 
As discussed in the Introduction, RDT suggests that firms are constantly involved 
in interchange with one another, or more broadly with the external environment, in pursuit 
of desired resources. Certainly, this is a dynamic process because firms need to adapt to 
continual changes in the environment. In this chapter, I examine prior literature deriving 
theoretical arguments that provide an understanding of the role of a firm’s board of 
directors in response to changes in the business environment and how particular 
dimensions of the board’s capital affect these responses. 
Because of their responsibility to shareholders, agency theory is frequently utilized 
as a lens to examine director behaviors. However, resource dependence theory has also 
emerged as a valuable perspective to explain why certain directors are selected (Withers, 
Hillman & Cannella, 2012) and what they provide to the firm (Hillman et al., 2000). 
Indeed, research has shown that RDT can be useful in explaining that a firm often replaces 
an outgoing board member with another board member with a similar background and 
expertise (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1986). Additionally, removal of board members whose 
reputations may be tainted by involvement on other boards is also in part dependent on 
the firm’s need for the resources that a board member provides (Cowen & Marcel, 2011). 
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Board Capital Breadth and Depth in the Context of the Board of Directors 
To understand the importance of board capital breadth and depth in the context of 
the board of directors, it is worthwhile to reexamine the role that the board of directors 
plays in the context of the firm. The board of directors is expected to 1) contract with and 
monitor the CEO on behalf of shareholders and 2) provide valuable resources to the firm, 
including advice and counsel to the CEO and top management teams, for instance on major 
strategic decisions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Literature examining the first set of roles 
primarily draws on agency theory; while resource dependence theory has been a primary 
lens for exploring the latter. Both, however, are intertwined with board capital as the same 
human and social capital that allows a board member to provide resources may also be 
predictors of monitoring ability. This intuitive relationship is described by Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003:389): 
Agency theorists have often employed measures of a board’s independence 
without considering the heterogeneity of monitoring ability. If we compare 
the monitoring ability of two boards, one dominated by outside, 
independent directors who are CEOs of Fortune 500 firms and the other 
dominated by outside, independent, small local business representatives, 
we see the CEOs’ experience, skills, and expertise are likely to make the 
former board more effective at monitoring than the latter.” 
It is worth noting that human capital is measured at an individual level (Wright, 
Coff, & Moliterno, 2014), based on a person’s experiences, skills and knowledge, and then 
aggregated to the board/firm level. Because definitions of human capital inherently imply 
that these individual-level attributes are situationally valuable or valuable in conjunction 
with how they are deployed by the firm (strategic human capital), the contingency of 
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human and board capital remains an underexplored area (Zona, Zattoni, & Minchilli, 
2013), which has recently received more attention (e.g., Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong. 
& Kor, 2014).  
In the following sections, board capital dimensions are examined in terms of how 
they are manifest in challenging environmental conditions; the focus is on understanding 
how having fewer resources heightens the value of resource-dependence theory as a useful 
lens (Zona et al., 2015) to interpret the board’s contribution to firm performance. This 
chapter continues to elucidate the relationships depicted in Figure 1. This figure indicates 
that board capital (breadth and depth) is expected to affect the strategic conformity of the 
firm and performance. I examine both depth within the industry as well as related 
expertise, as discussed in more detail in later sections. However, environmental shock is 
expected to alter the potential benefits of board breadth, industry experience, and relevant 
expertise. 
 
Figure 1. Return on Assets Trend for In-Sample Banks. 
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Crisis, Board Capital and Strategic Conformity 
A director brings a significant amount of both human and social capital to his or 
her role that in aggregate comprises board capital; below follows a discussion of the 
potential implications of board capital depth for both human and social capital. 
Human capital, as defined previously, is the extent of knowledge, skills and 
experience that uniquely equips the director to provide advice to the CEO (and presumably 
improves his/her ability to be an effective monitor). For instance, studies have often 
examined whether the director has previously served as a CEO of another firm as well as 
captured whether the director has prior work experience in the focal firm’s industry (e.g. 
Tian et al., 2011). In that research, the market reacted more favorably to CEO selections 
completed by board with higher human and social capital (Tian et al., 2011). More specific 
experiences that board members have, such as with entry into particular markets, have also 
been shown to affect the firm’s decision-making (Tuschke, Sanders, & Hernandez, 2014). 
While these attributes and experiences are possessed by individual directors, human 
capital can also be conceptualized at the unit-level, in this case the board (Ployhart et al., 
2014). 
Board human capital depth refers to the extent to which the human capital of the 
board members is concentrated in a particular functional area, the focal industry, or has a 
particular educational background. In essence, it should indicate the board members’ 
expertise in specific areas, however, their experiences and knowledge may have 
significant overlap. These similarities are likely to result in commonality of thought that 
could affect strategic decisions of the firm. 
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Human capital is only one dimension of board capital depth; the other dimension 
is social capital. Social capital as defined previously is the network of relationships upon 
which board members can draw in carrying out their board responsibilities. For example, 
board members may access information or resources through prior contacts and 
relationships. Thus, the firm benefits from the board members’ social capital as a key 
element of resource provision.  
However, if social capital is characterized by depth within the industry, board 
members may be drawing on an overlapping set of contacts. The information each board 
member shares may point to similar conclusions, reinforcing the tendency of the board to 
gravitate toward conclusions consistent with prevailing industry logics. Thus, board 
members’ own expectations and opinions are reinforced by the information they receive 
from other board members, and, in turn, the board is less likely to have reason to question 
or doubt the path recommended by the top management team. An actor’s position in a 
social network provides explanation as to the flow of information from one actor to the 
next (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011).  This may give those with experience in the industry the 
confidence to move forward with a strategy of their choosing, regardless of what strategies 
are adopted by others in the industry. 
Building from this, board capital breadth may have counter-intuitive ramifications 
for conformity.  Breadth is a description of functional diversity or job-related diversity 
that presumably increases the likelihood of cognitive diversity (Miller, Burke, & Glick, 
1998). As indicated, board networks help to explain both the quantity of information 
available to the board members (and in turn provided to company executives) as well as 
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its perceived quality, gaining a greater number of options to evaluate (Burt, 2004) and 
thereby greater likelihood of success in problem-solving (Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, 
1993). However, merely having access to novel information (bridging structural holes) is 
not sufficient for a firm to take action (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991). While 
weak ties can improve the diversity of information (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999), that 
information may be more credible when strong ties exist (Uzzi, 1997). Salancik pointed 
out that “parties interact to achieve, plan, coordinate or decide… The network structure 
reflects much about the functioning of organizations and, possibly, their coordination 
failures or achievements” (Salancik, 1995: 346). 
Thus, to the extent that board members from outside the industry or typical 
functional background have ideas that differ from the current direction of the firm, they 
may seek incremental, rather than radical changes to the firm’s business model and their 
products. By definition, board members from outside the industry are not central to the 
focal industry network. At the organizational-level, research examining change has found 
that the centrality of a change agent alters the likelihood of initiating and implementing 
innovative change (Battilana & Casciaro, 2012). If this tendency also applies at the 
industry-level, outside board members would be less likely to pursue strategic change. 
However, ties or connections to other industries may be more likely to contribute to novel 
ideas and strategic change than connections within the industry (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 
1997), because these ties enable a director to consider a greater range of strategic 
alternatives (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). In combination, while outside directors are 
best equipped to implement change, they may be less likely to be proactive. If board 
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members advocate for change, they may meet resistance in attempting to persuade the rest 
of the board, who may defer to the expertise of those with more time operating in the 
particular sector  
Further, board members whose domain knowledge is low may be prone to ensure 
that the firm is taking actions that would seem prudent to an outsider. This may include 
asking seemingly helpful questions of the CEO such as “What are our competitors doing?” 
and “How does this compare to industry norms?” This benchmarking approach is more 
likely to be employed by those with lower domain-specific knowledge, because those with 
more experience would be more confident in charting their own course.  
Thus, while outside board members are valued for their diverse expertise, they may 
actually contribute to isomorphic tendencies. Board members from other industries are 
most likely to be satisfied with strategic decisions that are in line with those of competitors.  
For these reasons, I expect that board capital breadth will be associated with greater 
strategic conformity. In combination, I expect:  
Hypothesis 3: Board composition affects strategic conformity of the firm such that 
board breadth (functional diversity) leads to greater strategic conformity.  
Board Capital, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Board capital in general is expected to improve firm performance because it 
improves the ability of the board to carry out its functions of monitoring and advising 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). In dynamic environments, director 
capital that comes from experience within the industry and that gained from board seats 
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in other industries have been found to be complementary in nature (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 
2009). Within this broad framework, I now consider more specifically the extent to which 
particular attributes of board capital may be associated with the effectiveness of 
monitoring versus resource provision, and, in turn, firm performance. 
The research suggests that multiple factors must be present for effective 
monitoring, notably including an element of expertise or skill (Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, 
& Andrus, 2016; Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2014). A high degree of industry-specific 
human capital within the board suggests that board members are more likely to view 
themselves as experts in the industry, on par with or perhaps even superior to the CEO. 
When this perceived expertise is high, the board members are more comfortable and 
confident in overseeing the actions of the CEO. Their advice may be frequent in nature, 
either by their own initiative or at the CEO’s invitation. The board collectively is more 
likely to be engaged and cohesive, as the members’ experience within the industry 
suggests that they have relatively similar professional experiences. This cohesiveness may 
have cumulative effects, increasing the frequency of monitoring activity. Similarly, the 
depth of industry-specific social capital increases the likelihood that the board members 
have overlapping professional and social relationships. If the CEO is resistant to 
monitoring, this type of board, given its connections within the industry, may also be more 
aware of alternatives who could replace the CEO if necessary. Accordingly, high-quality 
boards, that is those with the governance structures that facilitate the optimal level of 
advising and monitoring, have been shown to help reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy 
(Daily & Dalton, 1994). 
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Board capital breadth, in contrast, I argue is most beneficial for the board’s role of 
resource provision. Directors who have outside perspectives may be able to provide 
connections to potential suppliers, potential customers or other business contacts. They 
may have advice as to how certain situations or issues are resolved in another industry. 
Thus, board researchers generally expect CEOs to benefit when a board is populated by 
general business experts from other industries.  
This potential benefit is only manifest when this general expertise is transferable 
to the focal industry. Board expertise is often assumed to be transferable, presumably 
because board members are involved at a strategic level rather than the regular operations 
of a company. Board members are best positioned to provide advice when they have 
experience developing strategy in a similar environment (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
Accordingly, board members are often categorized based on their past experience as a 
CEO or in conducting particular activities, such as acquisitions or firing of a CEO 
(Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). However, past research on executives has shown 
that transferability and specificity represent a key trade-off, with highly specific human 
capital attracting higher salaries (Sturman, Walsh & Cheramie, 2008). While some 
experiences are certainly applicable, the transferability and specificity of board capital to 
particular industries is an important consideration when seeking to ascertain the benefits 
of depth versus breadth. 
It follows that the benefits of industry experience likely outweigh the benefits of 
breadth when board members are less able to apply their past knowledge and experience 
to the situations at hand. Further, the mere perception that their capital is less applicable 
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could reduce their likelihood to offer suggestions. As an example, the context of this 
research is the financial sector. The balance sheets of banks are fundamentally different 
than those of other industries, different ratios are used to analyze their performance, and 
the knowledge required to understand certain products is quite specialized.  As indicated 
in a later chapter by one of the interviewees, even individuals who previously served as 
CEOs at other companies are unlikely to be familiar with derivative products, apart from 
currency hedging.   
In this context, the benefits of breadth are less likely to be realized, while the 
benefits of industry experience become more salient. I hypothesize then that in these 
contexts, industry experience empowers a board to more ably fulfill its roles of monitoring 
and resource provision. Through these roles, the board has the opportunity to improve firm 
performance. Formally: 
Hypothesis 4: In the banking industry where transferability of human capital is 
low, industry experience more favorably affects performance than breadth.  
Using Contingency Theory to Predict Firm Performance in Crisis 
Scholars have long considered the contingency factors that alter the relationship 
between strategic leaders and firm performance (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 1999). 
Environmental disruption is one key contingency that likely moderates the relationships 
between industry expertise and breadth and firm performance. I first review environmental 
shocks in general and then articulate why shocks might alter directors’ contributions to 
firm performance. 
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Environmental shocks, whether due to technological innovation, changes in 
governmental regulation or macro-economic factors, alter a large number of “known” 
relationships (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). For instance, generally collaborative 
relationships are expected to benefit an organization; however, these relationships can 
increase the likelihood of failure when a shock disrupts them (Mitchell & Singh, 1996). 
Similarly, international diversification is generally expected to be associated with desired 
firm outcomes, yet Li and Tallman (2011) showed that the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 at least temporarily reversed this relationship.  
Turning to the likely effects of environmental shocks on board members and their 
firms’ actions, some research suggests that changes in the environment can lead to myopic 
reactions from individuals who consider themselves to be experts (Ingram & Baum, 1997).  
In a sense, this would be equivalent to an ostrich’s reaction (ignoring the potential danger) 
or “doubling-down” (increasing a bet despite unfavorable information) on a coming loss. 
The most embedded individuals may believe that the industry will recover quickly. For 
instance, when oil prices dropped rapidly during 2014, board members with the longest 
tenure in the industry might be the most likely to interpret the price movements in light of 
historical context and expect future rebounds. The threat-rigidity perspective provides a 
theoretical justification for this response. In essence, environmental threats can induce an 
organization to “revert to tried and tested competencies with more predictable outcomes 
that limit potential losses” (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008: 152). Prior research has 
shown that the availability of particular resources can affect organizational responses to 
environmental threats (Voss et al., 2008); similarly I extend this expectation to include 
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differential effects for board capital and strategic change. Benner (2010) provides 
evidence of the tendency of industry insiders to focus on strategies consistent with existing 
strategic approaches, demonstrating that analysts likely reward firms by favorable 
commentary and upgraded stock recommendations when they persist with harvesting cash 
flows from existing products in the face of technological change.  
Environmental conditions may heighten the organization’s existing tendencies, in 
this case, willingness to explore alternative approaches. When a firm is faced with 
environmental disruption, the board is more likely to offer and more likely to be called 
upon to offer advice and access to resources. In contrast, when the company and industry 
are performing well, the board may defer to the CEO (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). In 
considering the willingness to contribute resources, Boivie and colleagues (2016: 10) 
surmise: “punctuated events significantly increase the uncertainty (perceived or real) 
surrounding a firm, which generally results in a greater level of scrutiny from external 
observers such as stockholders, regulators and institutional investors. This increased 
scrutiny can threaten the legitimacy and reputation of the board, which provides incentive 
for directors to focus on the task at hand and to do their best to make optimal decisions.” 
This may be the catalyst necessary to overcome the bias toward strategic persistence that 
comes in part from pluralistic ignorance (Miller & McFarland, 1987; Westphal & Bednar, 
2005). Further, changing environmental conditions may lead the board to dedicate more 
attention to considering strategic change (Golden & Zajac, 2001). As He and Huang 
(2011:1125) describe from the opposite perspective: “the board’s involvement in firm 
strategies is generally reduced in good times.” To some extent, this is essentially a question 
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of how a board will react in light of negative environmental conditions. Will the board 
strengthen its investment into the organization?  
To this point, I have examined the board’s influence on strategic conformity. The 
discussion below more directly considers the effects of board composition on firm 
performance.  
First, I examine existing work in a particular context which may be more 
generalizable to firms as a whole. Matusik and Fitza (2012) utilized the venture capital 
context to demonstrate the benefits of diversified knowledge, suggesting that VC firms 
could pursue either a strategy of focused investment within a particular industry to obtain 
expertise or investing broadly to gain potential benefits. In doing so, they conclude that 
breadth of knowledge gained from investing broadly is valuable in settings characterized 
by high uncertainty (Matusik & Fitza, 2012). Thus, the value of depth versus breadth is 
dependent on environmental conditions.  
Starting with board capital depth as indicated by experience within the industry, 
experience should provide the firm with the knowledge and expertise and relationships to 
be able to successfully maneuver during times when an industry is generally performing 
well. This expectation is supported by past research on embeddedness and on resource 
management. However, when there is a proverbial rising tide lifting all boats, perhaps this 
experience is less needed to achieve strong organizational performance. 
Embeddedness is associated with a number of desired benefits in network theory 
(Uzzi, 1996). For instance, firms may have the knowledge or relationships to be able to 
manipulate the environment to their advantage. Similarly, board capital depth may 
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contribute to the firm’s resource management, as the firm structures its resource portfolio, 
bundles its resources into capabilities and then leverages these in the value-creation 
process (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Specifically, board depth is likely to be associated 
with knowledge of industry recipes that can inform management actions; these recipes are 
more valuable in stable environments (Sirmon et al., 2007).  Together, past research on 
embeddedness and on resource management suggests that board capital depth generally 
has the potential to result in performance advantages. 
However, embeddedness also has its limits, notably several myopic behaviors. The 
board may overlook or ignore potential opportunities as there are few diverse perspectives 
to challenge the CEO or the firm’s strategic direction. Embeddedness also has the potential 
to result in path-dependence and organizational inertia, limiting the firm’s ability to draw 
on new resources and relationships in the future (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997).  
Despite the potential drawbacks, there are reasons to believe that some of these 
advantages may be amplified during times when an industry goes through environmental 
shock. The board capital depth of these firms may better position them to evaluate the 
strategic benefits of acquiring struggling firms of the industry. Or, board capital depth may 
result in a firm having access to favorable opportunities to buy assets from struggling 
parties within the industry. Finally, they may be successful in persuading governments 
and other third parties to take actions that benefit them, because these other actors may 
defer to the expertise of firms with high board capital depth who are therefore perceived 
as industry leaders.  
For these reasons, I expect:  
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Hypothesis 5: Crisis moderates the relationship between board depth of industry 
experience and firm performance, such that depth improves performance 
following an economic shock. 
Environmental shock may also alter expectations regarding board breadth and firm 
performance. Board capital breadth may provide unique information flows that help the 
firm. Recent research has considered that the same structural positions can lead to different 
firm level outcomes (such as level of innovativeness) dependent upon the institutional 
environment (Vasudeva, Zaheer, & Hernandez, 2013); I similarly suggest that breadth is 
most advantageous under a particular set of environmental conditions. Notably, the 
information available to a firm with more breadth, as well as the ability of the board to 
decipher and interpret the relevance of that information, may be beneficial in helping to 
identify the onset of a crisis. Whether because of confident insight or healthy caution, the 
breadth of these boards may lead the firm to alter its positioning more quickly than other 
firms, particularly because these boards are less likely to engage in groupthink and 
therefore are less likely to experience path dependence. Further, the resources and 
connections of the board members may be beneficial if the firm decides to alter its strategic 
direction by diversifying into other industries or revenue sources. This coincides with the 
conclusion that in “older and high performing firms, more industry-specific experience is 
not only redundant, but it actually hurts the firm” (Sundaramurthy et al., 2014: 864). Firms 
that have more information that is external to the industry and are better able to weigh the 
credibility of information from outside of the focal industry should have better prescience 
in adapting in advance of disruptive innovation or more effective adaptation actions. This 
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capability is most valuable in times of economic duress as that is when the performance 
of firms following standard industry recipes are most at risk. The diversity of information 
within a network resulting from the breadth of board capital (sometimes measured as 
access to structural holes) could affect firm survival (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Gulati, 1998; 
Uzzi, 1996). Unfortunately, many CEOs faced with poor performance may respond by 
closing off their circle and becoming less likely to seek advice from those outside of their 
immediate circle (McDonald & Westphal, 2003), neglecting the potential benefits that 
breadth can provide. Thus, it is important that board capital breadth is already in place 
prior to the commencement of the crisis. 
The benefits of group diversity should be more discernible at some points in time 
than others. Past research drew on upper echelons theory to focus on how heterogeneity 
of management teams might be a “double-edged sword,” that is beneficial in context when 
the benefits of diverse information exceeded the costs of obstacles to communication and 
working relationships (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). Indeed, diversity in functional 
backgrounds can increase interpersonal conflict in top management teams and reduce the 
amount of strategic consensus amongst the team (Knight et al., 1999). Important 
contextual factors include the complexity of management decisions, the amount of time 
the group has to resolve disagreements, and the time that members of the group have spent 
working together in the past, which may allow for the development of shared 
understandings and routines (Carpenter, 2002). Functional diversity of top management 
teams was found to be more beneficial in contexts in which environmental uncertainty 
was high (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008). Drawing on this research about top management 
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teams, with a focus on boards and environmental disruption, I propose that environmental 
factors affect the benefits of board breadth for three reasons.  
First, environmental conditions may affect the likelihood of valuable information 
being generated. For instance, research demonstrates that high levels of environmental 
turbulence increases the “propensity of firms to create and use knowledge”, also referred 
to as learning orientation (Hanvanich, Sivakumar, & Hult, 2006: 601).  
Second, environmental conditions may affect whether the group chooses to act on 
the information provided. Some evidence suggests that diversity in groups may in general 
slow decision times. However, industry-wide crises share many characteristics with the 
high-velocity environments studied by Eisenhardt (1989). In these contexts, CEOs may 
be more open to greater experimentation and thus more willing to consider board 
suggestions. Further, boards with breadth in their role as information providers are better 
able to generate multiple alternatives; Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that the availability of 
multiple alternatives to consider is associated with more rapid and decisive decision-
making.   
Finally, environmental conditions may affect the value that results from acting on 
this information by introducing a unique opportunity for firms that respond quickly 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). By definition, acting on information that is unknown to or 
underweighted by other market actors places the firm in a contrarian position that opposes 
the current momentum of the market (Ball, Kothari, & Shanken, 1995). Similar to other 
contrarian investments, the full performance benefits of this position, investment or action 
may only accrue at a later point in time. For instance, literature on first mover advantage 
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finds that firms acting on superior information at the beginning of an acquisition wave 
generate superior returns that are only fully realized over a three year period (Carow et al., 
2004). Similarly, when environments are disrupted, firms are able to use information to 
take decisive strategic actions and may continue to accrue performance benefits beyond 
the end of a particular financial reporting year. 
However, some scholars have found that environmental turbulence may instead 
accentuate the disadvantages of board diversity. Specifically, heterogeneity may decrease 
the ability of the board to reach consensus (Goodstein et al., 1994), and thus contribute to 
strategic paralysis. In their study of hospitals in California, these authors found a negative 
relationship between board functional diversity and the number of strategic changes 
initiated (Goodstein et al., 1994). Yet, this implies a bias against action and does not 
examine the initial strategic positioning of the firm, strategic actions of competitors nor 
firm performance. Further, the design considered all years in the sample to be a time of 
environmental turbulence for the industry, and therefore did not allow for determining 
whether relationships between diversity and strategic change are indeed affected by 
environmental conditions. This research takes a more holistic view; a count of strategic 
changes may evidence board action but not necessarily the benefits that strategic 
positioning may yield. For example, firms may benefit from starting in a less vulnerable 
position when the crisis hits, fewer but more valuable strategic actions during times of 
crisis, and resources such as information that are helpful to the firm through other 
mechanisms. 
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In combination, I argue that board capital breadth has the greatest potential to result 
in performance advantages during times of crisis, because this may increase the likelihood 
that the board produces or identifies uniquely valuable information, the likelihood of the 
board acting on this information, and ultimately contribute to recognition by the market 
of the value of this contrarian stance. For these reasons, I hypothesize that board capital 
breadth has the strong potential to result in performance advantages during times of crisis. 
Boards characterized by a higher degree of breadth may have a higher sense of 
responsibility to shareholders or feel that they have less to lose in speaking out when 
performance is at risk. Others have pointed out that the career advancement of independent 
directors, who come from diverse industries, is less dependent upon the CEO and therefore 
they may be more sensitive to shareholder and stakeholder needs (de Villiers et al., 2011). 
Given their experience in other industries beyond the core industry of the focal firm, these 
directors may feel the need to ask questions and be actively engaged when it is clear that 
the firm is operating in an industry undergoing significant change. They may be sensitive 
to the potential for adverse effects if they are associated with a firm that has poor 
performance, one that is accused of misconduct, or one that ultimately fails. Their 
experience in other industries suggests that they may be aware of norms from those 
industries that could be implemented here, ranging from risk assessment to financial 
control (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003). Further, boards that benefit from this 
diversity of views are more likely to generate and consider creative or novel ideas because 
they are less hampered by the need to accept prevailing logics. For instance, board 
members for a company such as Kodak that had less expertise in photography may have 
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been more likely to support the CEO’s attempts to explore digital photography (Benner, 
2010). In combination then, the importance of active monitoring will be heightened for a 
board characterized by a high degree of breadth when the firm is most at risk. 
For these reasons, it would follow that: 
Hypothesis 6: Crisis moderates the relationship between board capital breadth 
and firm performance such that breadth improves performance following an 
economic shock. 
Prior research has established a general expectation that industry experience has 
an effect on board-related outcomes (Johnson et al., 2013). However, generally studies on 
boards treat industry experience and industry expertise as interchangeable. For instance, 
in a recently published study, board industry expertise is measured as the proportion of 
directors who also had a work role at another firm that shared the first three digits of a 
four digit SIC code with the focal firm (Oehmichen, Shcrapp & Wolff, 2016). In another, 
board member expertise is also measured through the use of 3-digit SIC overlap and 
expertise is defined as a director having served as a manager or board member of such a 
firm (Kroll, Walters & Wright, 2008). While breadth measures indicate the potential 
importance of functional diversity and experience outside the industry, it is also important 
to consider that some directors may bring a superior amount of relevant, technical 
knowledge to certain industries. Indeed, a limited pool of prior studies – now over a decade 
old  – have considered the role of financial expertise as a particular type of knowledge that 
can be valuable to the board (Johnson et al., 2013). Research from other disciplines has 
primarily examined whether financial experts on the board are associated with financial 
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reporting quality or tax strategies (e.g., McGuire, Omer, & Wang, 2012), not their 
connection to overall firm performance. The financial sector is one such industry where 
many broad, general business experiences could be less transferrable and applicable. The 
complexity of financial products (as elaborated in Chapter VI) suggests that only a limited 
pool of individuals are likely to have the technical knowledge necessary to understand the 
particular instruments in which many of the banks were heavily invested. 
From a resource-dependence perspective, the availability of such expertise may be 
a useful resource for the firm. Directors who bring breadth from other industries may find 
it difficult to link their experiences or social capital to the particular issues faced by a 
financial firm. They may feel less confident to speak up or challenge the CEO of a firm 
whose challenges are uniquely complex and technical, or perhaps prefer not to admit a 
lack of understanding about a particular issue considered. In contrast then, directors who 
come from outside the industry but have a high level of technical expertise from a pertinent 
domain (in this case finance or accounting), may prove to be effective monitors who are 
still able to bring valuable perspectives from outside the industry. As discussed above, 
environmental shock may be the contingency that is necessary to bring these perspectives 
to the forefront such that the directors are sufficiently motivated to engage or for the 
resources they can provide to become valuable. When the industry is performing well, 
directors are more likely to defer to management and to directors with more industry-
experience. The director may risk alienation if he or she challenges a CEO who is 
performing well. However, when the firm and its performance are at risk, the director may 
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feel a greater responsibility to act, as well as believe that he or she may be able to offer 
valuable advice or resources. 
 Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7: Crisis moderates the relationship between board depth of relevant 
expertise and firm performance, such that expertise is valuable to the firm during 
periods of environmental shock for the industry. 
In this chapter, I have reviewed relevant literatures, presented the theoretical logic 
and developed hypotheses as to how board capital depth and breadth are associated with 
board activities, changes in board composition and ultimately firm performance. In the 
next chapter, I provide a description of the methodology used to test these relationships. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides a description of the methodology employed to test the 
hypotheses outlined in Chapters II and III. I first describe the context and sample; then 
define the operationalization of all of the major variables use in my analysis; and finally 
provide an overview of the statistical tests applied. 
Context and Sample 
This research examines whether board-level factors can affect firm-level outcomes 
differentially based on environmental context, and how changes in the environment can 
alter the value of dimensions of board capital. Thus, the U.S. financial sector is an ideal 
context for three reasons. First, the financial sector recently experienced a systemic crisis 
which affected all firms in the sector, yet most firms either did not predict or ignored signs 
of this crisis coming (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). Thus, it provides a fertile laboratory for 
examination of whether board factors affected strategic responses before, during and after 
the crisis. Second, industry-specific knowledge is generally regarded as valuable in this 
industry as finance occupations have reached a high-level of professionalization 
(Lounsbury, 2002). Finally, the magnitude of this crisis was severe, arguably the most 
significant in the U.S. since the Great Depression (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
2011), and therefore banks across the sector regardless of location or specialty were 
affected. 
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The empirical sample consists of depository institutions and their boards that were 
part of the financial sector during the period of 2005-2013. These dates include time prior 
to broad recognition of the Financial Crisis, as well as time after the crisis subsided (2005-
2007: “Pre-Crisis, 2008-2010: “Crisis”, 2011-2013: “Post-Crisis”). To enable calculation 
of lead and lagged versions of key firm performance variables, I capture financial data 
from 2003-2015. 
The sample is narrowed to entities that are subject to enhanced reporting 
requirements with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve due 
to the greater quantity of financial disclosures that are available for such entities. In 
particular, this dissertation research draws on the lending and investment portfolio 
reporting that is provided on Form Y-9C and Form Y-9LP, which are filings required of 
bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of at least $500 million.  
This approach is consistent with previous research in accounting and finance (Ellul 
& Yerramilli, 2013; Wall & Peterson, 1995) that focused on bank holding companies. In 
addition, sampled entities must be categorized as “Banks” in BoardEx and have data for 
one or more corresponding firm-years in the CompuStat Fundamentals Annual dataset as 
matched by the identifier. These firms have two-digit SIC-codes beginning with 60 
(predominantly 6020 and 6035). BoardEx provides data on board memberships and 
director-level attributes, while CompuStat includes firm and industry-level financial 
information. Director-level data is sourced from BoardEx and includes a significant 
amount of information on board composition, other board memberships, and committee 
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assignments. Further information is available regarding directors’ other board service, past 
career experiences and non-corporate roles.  
A total of 348 unique firms were identified as part of the sample along with 
approximately 7,000 directors who served on one or more of their boards for some period 
of time during the period of interest.  
Dependent Variables 
This dissertation research focuses on multiple firm-level outcomes corresponding 
to the different hypotheses. They are operationalized as follows: 
Strategic conformity (deviation), a dependent variable in some models and a 
predictor in others, is the extent to which a firm’s strategic positioning conforms to 
(deviates from) that of other firms in the industry. I draw on prior research that examines 
a firm’s conformity (or conversely deviation) from industry norms in regard to key ratios 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Miller et al., 2013). 
Following other work in the financial sector (Deephouse, 1999; Delgado-Garcia & De la 
Fuente-Sabate, 2010), I calculate asset strategy by examining the variance of the focal 
firm on key asset categories (e.g. fixed assets as a percentage of total assets) compared to 
industry means. The percentage of assets that a bank holds in particular resources and loan 
products on its balance sheet represents the particular asset allocation of that bank and this 
may be a key determinant of its profitability. Following Miller and colleagues (2013), 
these measures are aggregated into a non-conformity index by 1) calculating the absolute 
value of the number of standard deviations from the median on each of these measures, 2) 
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standardizing these scores to ensure that each measure contributes proportionately, and 3) 
summing the standardized measures of deviation. Where appropriate, for clarity and 
consistency, this sum is multiplied by minus one to serve as a measure of strategic 
conformity (Delgado-Garcia & De la Fuente-Sabate, 2010). Note that while I calculate 
Chronbach’s alpha, this index is multidimensional and formative such that each 
component may contribute distinctly and therefore a high value is not necessarily expected 
or desired (Miller et al., 2013). Following Deephouse (1999), I employ the full range of 
portfolio information that is available, so conformity incorporates the following items: 
commercial loans, real estate loans, consumer loans, agricultural loans, other loans, cash 
balances, overnight money, investment securities, trading assets, fixed assets and other 
assets.  
Loan concentration is calculated using the same calculation of concentration as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index; that is, the percentage of each category to the whole is 
squared and summed. Higher values represent greater concentration.  
Firm performance is primarily measured as Return on Assets. While bankruptcy 
might be the strongest indicator that a firm was unable to continue the path of its chosen 
strategy, many U.S. banks are deemed too big to fail, and accordingly the system has a 
number of checks and balances that result in relatively few banks experiencing 
bankruptcy, even in the midst of the financial crisis. In some models, firm performance is 
also calculated as an average of the return on assets observed in the subsequent three 
years, as some effects from changes to the strategic direction of the firm or from taking 
contrarian positions may take time to manifest. 
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Volatility of performance is calculated as the deviation in performance for a firm 
calculated as the sum of the squared differences between the firm’s average yearly 
performances for the ensuing three-year period. 
Independent Variables 
Board industry experience (Experience) is the extent to which the board has 
significant past work history within the industry. This is an indicator of the depth of board 
capital within the focal industry, which indicates elements of both the relevant human and 
social capital of the directors. While this is measured in several different ways in the 
literature, such as the proportion of the board members that have experience in the industry 
(Haynes & Hillman, 2010), I calculated a continuous measure based on the total years of 
experience in the financial sector obtained from the work history of all board members. 
For incorporation in models, this variable is transformed into an average based on the 
number of board members and by taking the natural log to account for skewness.   
Board capital breadth (Breadth) is the heterogeneity of a board’s experiences and 
backgrounds, including functional backgrounds, occupational backgrounds and ties to 
other industries. I follow Haynes and Hillman (2010) in creating a diversity index that 
sums the diversity ratio for each of these three components. Blau’s index is appropriate 
for this calculation because it indicates the extent to which interactions amongst the group 
are expected to be altered by the range of experiences that members bring to their role as 
a board member (Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
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Board relevant expertise (Fin. Expert) is the number of years that board members 
have worked in a finance-related position, indicated either by the sector, accounting or 
finance qualification, or job title.  
Control Variables 
As informed by prior research, I seek to control for a variety firm and board level 
factors that may influence either the performance measure or the measured network 
indicators.  
The firm-level controls are prior performance, firm size, capital structure and firm 
age. A firm’s performance is partly the result of past performance, so to control for prior 
performance, I include the prior year’s return on assets (net income/total assets). I control 
for firm size as indicated by total assets, as this measure may indicate different levels of 
resources available to the firm (Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015) and because 
directors of larger firms may gain prestige from their access to greater resources and 
involvement in more influential decisions (Withers, 2011). Additionally, size indicates the 
scope of transactions within firm boundaries and thereby may contribute to director 
expertise in decisions to expand the firm across industry lines or, in contrast, decisions to 
divest certain businesses (Josefy et al., 2015). A bank’s returns are affected in part by the 
reserves it holds on its balance sheet, therefore I control for capital structure by 
incorporating the prior period’s Tier 1 Capital Ratio. This ratio is reported by the banks 
on the Form Y-9C and calculated according regulatory requirements. In essence, Tier 1 
capital generally includes a bank’s shareholder’s equity and retained earnings and this 
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value is divided by total risk-weighted assets. The ratio serves as a measure of capital 
adequacy, for instance in the event of losses on loans and depositor withdrawals. Finally, 
I control for firm age, calculated as the number of years since founding, as this may 
indicate advantages or differences due to the history, status and perceived stability of the 
financial institution. 
Board-level controls include board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, board age and 
gender diversity, director network, and insiders. Board size, a count of the number of 
board members, is included as it may affect group decision-making dynamics (Boivie et 
al., 2016). The power of the board relative to the CEO may affect its ability to be involved 
in decision-making, so I control for CEO duality (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014) 
and CEO tenure (Haynes & Hillman, 2010). Board age is included as a control as it may 
influence the board’s risk-taking preferences. Gender diversity (Female Directors), 
measured as the count of female directors, is controlled for because some studies have 
shown that board actions differ when women are involved in board decision-making 
(Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014). Director network is the count (transformed as a natural 
log) of director ties via board interlocks, which is an indicator of a board member’s overall 
social capital linked to other firms. Insiders is the number of board members who are also 
executives of the company, because their presence and lack of independence may affect 
the dynamics of board deliberations. 
Industry effects are limited due to the focus on a single industry, and time effects 
are limited by the use of set time periods across all firms and the definition of 2008-2010 
  
70 
 
as being the years during which the effects of the environmental shock were observed in 
the banking sector. 
Data Analysis 
Because the environmental context is a key focus of my hypotheses, models are 
specified by classifying the firm-year observations of the sample into the three time 
periods of focus: pre-crisis (2005-2007), crisis (2008-2010) and post-crisis (2011-2013). 
This allows for the examination of the interaction of a dummy variable for crisis years 
with the variables of interest to ascertain whether the primary relationships are different 
when environmental disruption occurs. The use of interaction terms is a common method 
for testing contingency hypotheses, along with sub-group analysis (Boyd, Haynes, Hitt, 
Bergh, & Ketchen, 2012). The advantage of the interaction approach is obtaining the full 
statistical power of all available observations.  
All OLS regression models include clustering by firm in models where this is 
appropriate. In each test, the control variables are entered first, then the variables of 
interest, and finally interaction terms. To ensure that the data appropriately reflect the 
primary assumptions necessary to rely on the results of multiple regression, the variance 
inflation factors are calculated to check the potential for multicollinearity. In a model 
including all base-level variables, all VIFs were observed to be less than 3.4 and 
multicollinearity is not believed to be a concern. For the hypothesized moderations, the 
base level variables are included in the model along with their product (Aguinis, Edwards, 
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& Bradley, 2016). For interpretation purposes however, variables are centered before 
generating interaction terms (Aguinis et al., 2016).   
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. 
Hypothesis 1 considers the relationship between the strategic deviation that a firm 
pursues and subsequent variation in firm performance. These results are reported in Table 
2 and provide support for the hypothesis. Strategic deviation has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient (p < .01). As strategic deviation rises, the volatility of 
returns in subsequent time periods is found to decline, controlling for firm characteristics 
and board composition. As a robustness check, an alternate model was developed checking 
the relationship between strategic deviation and future performance in place of 
performance volatility. Deviation was shown to have a statistically significant and positive 
relationship with overall future firm performance, indicating that deviation is associated 
with additional desired firm outcomes in addition to the hypothesized relationship with 
lower volatility. Please see Table 2. Note that in all tables robust standard errors with firm 
clustering are used in significance tests and the corresponding standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance with a p-value of .01, .05, and 
.10, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Hypothesis 2 examines whether environmental shock (in this case the Financial 
Crisis noted in the results as ‘Crisis’) alters the relationship between strategic deviance 
and performance, with deviation expected to be more valuable during periods of shock. 
While there is a main effect for strategic deviance and performance, the interaction term 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Performance/ROA 0.005 0.16 1.000 0.610 0.110 -0.629 0.006 0.018 0.123 0.083 0.040 0.097 
2. Tobin’s Q 1.033 0.12 0.610 1.000 0.095 -0.604 0.066 0.004 0.122 0.101 0.066 0.106 
3. RI -0.1m 2.1m 0.110 0.095 1.000 -0.079 -0.100 0.097 -0.042 -0.062 -0.015 0.036 
4. Lagged ROA 0.006 0.014
-
-0.629 -0.604 -0.079 1.000 0.008 -0.020 -0.099 -0.042 -0.055 -0.112 
5. Lagged Assets 36.8B 207B 0.006 0.066 -0.100 0.008 1.000 0.085 0.466 0.476 0.303 0.180 
6. Lagged Tier 1 Cap .039 1.32 0.018 0.004 0.097 -0.020 0.085 1.000 -0.002 0.066 0.005 0.022 
7. Firm Age 17.3 10.9 0.123 0.122 -0.042 -0.099 0.466 -0.002 1.000 0.521 0.288 0.249 
8. Director Network Size 7.80 .981 0.083 0.101 -0.062 -0.042 0.476 0.066 0.521 1.000 0.489 0.219 
9. Board Size 11.1 3.01 0.040 0.066 -0.015 -0.055 0.303 0.005 0.288 0.489 1.000 0.175 
10. CEO Duality .595 .491 0.097 0.106 0.036 -0.112 0.180 0.022 0.249 0.219 0.175 1.000 
11. CEO Tenure 6.57 6.04 0.028 -0.032 0.032 -0.047 -0.066 -0.013 -0.048 -0.171 -0.029 0.054 
12. Board Age 61.2 3.77 0.052 0.038 -0.024 -0.037 0.117 0.005 0.143 -0.056 0.026 0.052 
13. Gender Diversity 1.17 1.02 0.076 0.066 0.000 -0.058 0.262 0.024 0.333 0.428 0.439 0.118 
14. Insiders 1.53 .844 0.068 0.114 0.010 -0.090 0.061 0.007 0.012 0.126 0.319 0.283 
15. Strategic Deviance 1.60 .545 0.160 0.202 -0.046 -0.189 -0.128 0.097 0.158 0.175 -0.073 0.117 
16. Board Breadth 1.46 .278 -0.080 -0.089 0.088 0.025 -0.303 -0.072 -0.388 -0.544 -0.179 0.017 
17. Industry Experience 16.8 4.48 0.063 0.023 -0.040 -0.012 0.104 -0.015 0.161 0.007 -0.065 0.045 
18. Financial Expert 3.09 2.97 0.071 0.017 -0.068 -0.008 0.115 0.023 0.236 0.321 -0.040 0.111 
19. Crisis .324 .468 -0.326 -0.161 -0.086 0.180 -0.039 0.038 0.001 -0.030 -0.006 -0.019 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. ROA 0.028 0.052 0.076 0.068 0.160 -0.080 0.063 0.071 -0.326 
2. Tobin’s Q -0.032 0.038 0.066 0.114 0.202 -0.089 0.023 0.017 -0.161 
3. RI 0.032 -0.024 0.000 0.010 -0.046 0.088 -0.040 -0.068 -0.086 
4. Lagged ROA -0.047 -0.037 -0.058 -0.090 -0.189 0.025 -0.012 -0.008 0.180 
5. Lagged Assets -0.066 0.117 0.262 0.061 -0.128 -0.303 0.104 0.115 -0.039 
6. Lagged Tier 1
Cap
-0.013 0.005 0.024 0.007 0.097 -0.072 -0.015 0.023 0.038 
7. Firm Age -0.048 0.143 0.333 0.012 0.158 -0.388 0.161 0.236 0.001 
8. D. Network
Size
-0.171 -0.056 0.428 0.126 0.175 -0.544 0.007 0.321 -0.030 
9. Board Size -0.029 0.026 0.439 0.319 -0.073 -0.179 -0.065 -0.040 -0.006 
10. CEO Duality 0.054 0.052 0.118 0.283 0.117 0.017 0.045 0.111 -0.019 
11. CEO Tenure 1.000 0.194 -0.072 0.151 0.015 0.161 0.150 -0.072 0.000 
12. Board Age 0.194 1.000 -0.027 0.027 0.000 -0.001 0.471 -0.034 0.013 
13. Female
Directors
-0.072 -0.027 1.000 0.017 0.003 -0.323 -0.077 0.104 -0.008 
14. Inside Expert 0.151 0.027 0.017 1.000 0.083 0.383 0.127 0.032 -0.024 
15. Strat. Deviance 0.015 0.000 0.003 0.083 1.000 -0.217 0.015 0.172 0.017 
16. Breadth 0.161 -0.001 -0.323 0.383 -0.217 1.000 -0.004 -0.315 0.004 
17. Experience 0.150 0.471 -0.077 0.127 0.015 -0.004 1.000 0.316 0.007 
18. Fin. Expert -0.072 -0.034 0.104 0.032 0.172 -0.315 0.316 1.000 -0.043 
19. Crisis 0.000 0.013 -0.008 -0.024 0.017 0.004 0.007 -0.043 1.000 
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Table 2 Pre-crisis Strategic Deviation 
DV = ROA (bp*100) 
OLS Regression Controls Main Effects 
Intercept -1.553 -0.999 
(-1.083) (-0.695) 
Director Network Size 0.274** 0.285*** 
(2.568) (2.673) 
Board Size -0.128*** -0.147*** 
(-4.379) (-4.941) 
CEO Duality -0.452*** -0.442*** 
(-3.192) (-3.119) 
CEO Tenure 0.027** 0.029** 
(2.333) (2.466) 
Board Age 0.060*** 0.060*** 
(3.532) (3.446) 
Female Directors 0.246*** 0.226*** 
(3.971) (3.624) 
Insiders 0.004 0.067 
(0.042) (0.647) 
Lagged ROA -37.183** -34.793** 
(-2.333) (-2.160) 
Lagged Assets -0.045 -0.014 
(-0.642) (-0.186) 
Lagged Tier 1 Capital 0.000 0.000 
(0.451) (0.641) 
Firm Age 0.013* 0.013* 
(1.817) (1.799) 
Breadth 0.081 -0.110 
(0.243) (-0.337) 
Experience 0.279** 0.254** 
(2.270) (2.034) 
Fin. Expert 0.070 0.075 
(0.966) (1.037) 
Crisis -2.491*** -2.479*** 
(-15.864) (-15.742) 
Strategic Deviance -0.410*** 
(-2.982) 
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.114 
F Score (15-16, 401) 29.60*** 29.41*** 
Observations 2,526 2,526 
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is not statistically significant as reported in Table 3. Thus, the hypothesis does not receive 
support. Please see Table 3 
Hypothesis 3 consider the potential effects of board composition on strategic 
conformity, specifically suggesting that board breadth leads to greater strategic conformity 
(lower strategic deviation). As shown in Table 4 with strategic deviation as the dependent 
variable, this hypothesis receives support as breadth is shown to have a statistically 
significant (p<.001) and negative coefficient in the model. Please see Table 4. 
Please see Table 5. The models in Table 5 provide results for testing Hypotheses 
4-7. The overall models are statistically significant (p < .001). However, as variables are 
added to the model, the F score does not improve, indicating that the quality of the models 
may not be stronger than the base model with controls only and the findings should be 
interpreted with caution. The change in R-squared is tested using the Wald-test reported 
within STATA using the ‘nestreg’ command. Only the interaction effect for financial 
expertise and crisis indicates marginally statistically significant improvement (p < .10) 
over the model with controls only; the other models do not indicate a significant 
improvement in R-squared.  
Hypothesis 4 examines whether industry experience is more valuable than breadth 
in this particular industry context in which the transferability of human capital is low. The 
model detailed in Table 5 predicts performance, again controlling for firm and board 
characteristics. Breadth has a statistically significant (p<.05) and negative relationship 
with firm performance, while industry experience has a marginally statistically significant 
(p<.10) and positive relationship with firm performance. These coefficients are confirmed  
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Table 3 Strategic Deviation, Board Composition and Performance 
DV = ROA (bp*100)     
OLS Regression, n=2,526  Controls Main Effects Deviation Interaction 
Intercept  6.430 7.572* 7.724* 
  (4.405) (4.367) (4.389) 
Director Network Size  0.475 0.449 0.445 
  (0.435) (0.428) (0.430) 
Board Size   -0.144 -0.099 -0.097 
  (0.145) (0.133) (0.134) 
CEO Duality  0.716 0.691 0.692 
  (0.511) (0.513) (0.513) 
CEO Tenure  0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) 
Board Age  0.082 0.081 0.079 
  (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) 
Female Directors  0.447* 0.495** 0.492** 
  (0.239) (0.247) (0.248) 
Inside Expert  0.714 0.563 0.580 
  (0.575) (0.530) (0.526) 
Lagged ROA  -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lagged Assets  -0.918*** -0.994*** -0.997*** 
  (0.328) (0.352) (0.352) 
Lagged Tier 1 Capital  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Age  0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Breadth  -1.194*** -1.066** -1.070** 
  (0.433) (0.418) (0.417) 
Experience  0.602* 0.636* 0.618* 
  (0.335) (0.342) (0.349) 
Fin. Expert  0.156 0.143 0.144 
  (0.240) (0.240) (0.241) 
Crisis  -7.726*** -7.754*** -7.700*** 
  (0.867) (0.861) (0.836) 
Strategic Deviation   0.538* 0.296 
   (0.314) (0.363) 
Strategic Deviation *Crisis    0.815 
    (0.668) 
Adjusted R2  0.442 0.443 0.443 
F Score (15-17, 401)  50.92*** 47.64*** 45.05*** 
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Table 4 Board Composition 
DV = Strategic Deviation   
OLS Regression   
Intercept  -2.125** 
  (0.912) 
Director Network Size  0.050 
  (0.059) 
Board Size   -0.084*** 
  (0.016) 
CEO Duality  0.046 
  (0.076) 
CEO Tenure  0.006 
  (0.006) 
Board Age  0.001 
  (0.012) 
Female Directors  -0.089** 
  (0.043) 
Inside Expert  0.280*** 
  (0.050) 
Lagged ROA  -0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
Lagged Assets  0.141*** 
  (0.047) 
Lagged Tier 1 Capital  0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
Firm Age  0.000 
  (0.005) 
Breadth  -0.238*** 
  (0.061) 
Experience  -0.063 
  (0.047) 
Fin. Expert  0.024 
  (0.041) 
Crisis  0.053* 
  (0.028) 
   
Adjusted R2  0.210 
F Score (15, 401)  13.08*** 
Observations  2,526 
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Table 5 The Interactive Effects of Crisis and Board Composition on Performance 
OLS Regression, 
n=2,526 
Controls Interaction 1 Interaction 2 Interaction 3 Full 
Model 
Intercept 7.572* 7.453* 7.503* 7.454* 7.340* 
 (4.367) (4.372) (4.380) (4.367) (4.384) 
Director Network Size 0.449 0.469 0.450 0.470 0.482 
 (0.428) (0.429) (0.428) (0.428) (0.428) 
Board Size  -0.099 -0.109 -0.104 -0.105 -0.116 
 (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) (0.132) 
CEO Duality 0.691 0.692 0.681 0.682 0.679 
 (0.513) (0.514) (0.512) (0.513) (0.513) 
CEO Tenure -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Board Age 0.081 0.082 0.084 0.082 0.084 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) 
Female Directors 0.495** 0.486* 0.505** 0.498** 0.498** 
 (0.247) (0.249) (0.249) (0.248) (0.251) 
Inside Expert 0.563 0.564 0.569 0.564 0.569 
 (0.530) (0.529) (0.528) (0.529) (0.528) 
Lagged ROA -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lagged Assets -0.994*** -0.993*** -0.998*** -0.994*** -0.996*** 
 (0.352) (0.352) (0.352) (0.352) (0.352) 
Lagged Tier 1 Capital 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Firm Age 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Breadth -1.066** -1.066** -0.834** -1.065** -0.894** 
 (0.418) (0.416) (0.422) (0.416) (0.419) 
Experience 0.636* 0.325 0.631* 0.655* 0.395 
 (0.342) (0.296) (0.342) (0.341) (0.293) 
Fin. Expert 0.143 0.157 0.150 -0.227 -0.108 
 (0.240) (0.241) (0.241) (0.202) (0.200) 
Crisis -7.754*** -7.775*** -7.753*** -7.720*** -7.745*** 
 (0.861) (0.858) (0.858) (0.854) (0.852) 
Strategic Deviation 0.538* 0.502 0.535* 0.532* 0.503 
 (0.314) (0.317) (0.313) (0.314) (0.317) 
Experience * Crisis  1.007   0.812 
  (0.646)   (0.679) 
Breadth * Crisis   -0.714  -0.525 
   (0.553)  (0.556) 
Financial Expert * Crisis    1.151* 0.832 
    (0.591) (0.629) 
Adjusted R2 0.443 0.443 0.443 0.443 0.444 
F Score (16 to 19, 401) 47.64*** 46.71*** 44.49*** 45.38*** 42.17*** 
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to be statistically different from one another (p<.05) using the suest command in Stata. 
Therefore, the hypothesis suggesting that experience is more valuable to the firm than 
breadth receives support.  
Hypothesis 5 suggests that environmental shock, in this context the Financial 
Crisis, will alter the relationship between industry experience and performance. The 
corresponding model is also shown in Table 5. The coefficient for the interaction term 
between experience and crisis years is not statistically significant. Thus, these results 
provide no support for the hypothesis. However, in subsequent testing, an alternate 
measure of firm performance over the subsequent three years is used. In this model, 
considering a longer measurement window for performance, the coefficient for the 
interaction term is statistically significant (p < .001) and positive. This suggests that 
industry experience benefits directors in guiding their firms through an environmental 
shock, though it may not be reflected in contemporaneous assessments of firm 
performance.  
Hypothesis 6 similarly suggests that environmental shock will alter the 
relationship between board breadth and performance. The interaction term is not 
statistically significant, as indicated in Table 5, Interaction 2, and, therefore, the model 
does not provide support for the hypothesis. An alternate specification was completed 
using a split sample to test whether rather than a change in the form of the relationship 
there was change in the strength of the relationship between breadth and performance 
during crisis (Hitt, Boyd & Li, 2004). During the non-crisis period, breadth is shown to 
have a negative and statistically significant main effect on performance, but this 
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coefficient is not found to be statistically significant during crisis periods. While there are 
over 2,500 observations in the model, the large number of controls needed to account for 
prior research on firm performance and boards reduces the statistical power available to 
test the interaction. It is possible that with more statistical power, the interaction could be 
validated as hypothesized. However, an alternate interpretation is that breadth can lead to 
divergent outcomes; the benefits of diversity in the boardroom may help some firms to 
perform well while other firms pursue strategic directions that are less successful. The 
variance in outcomes could negate the ability to observe any benefits that may exist for 
having a breadth of perspectives during crisis.  
Hypothesis 7 introduces the notion that relevant expertise may provide benefits to 
firms when an environmental shock has occurred. The interaction is marginally 
statistically significant and positive (p < .10), indicating that shock enhances the effects 
of expertise on performance, as indicated in Table 5. To probe this interaction, the 
performance of firms is plotted as shown below in Figure 2. In the plot, the mean 
performance for firms is shown for one standard deviation below the mean and one 
standard deviation above the mean, both for time periods during the crisis and outside of 
the crisis time horizon. The slope for expertise is tested and found to be statistically 
significant (p < .01) providing support for the hypothesis that higher levels of expertise 
are associated with higher levels of performance during crisis.  
These findings are also summarized by hypothesis in Appendix A-1; please see 
Appendix A-1 for more detail. 
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Figure 2. The Benefit of Financial Expertise in a Crisis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERVIEWS 
As elucidated in the Introduction, the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 continues to 
attract significant attention from policymakers and the public because of its significant 
impact on the global economy and thereby people and institutions across the world. In 
light of the broad scope of this phenomenon, I supplement the quantitative, archival data 
used in this dissertation with additional qualitative data, both to help interpret the findings 
of the research (and perhaps validate the approach) and to identify potentially valuable 
research questions for future research. 
Therefore, I completed five interviews with individuals who had intimate 
experience with the phenomenon because of the professional capacity in which they 
served or continue to serve. In combination, these individuals served on the boards of 
major financial institutions, in executive decision-making positions of focal organizations 
including both banks themselves and the regulators, and within organizations that could 
be classified as both conforming and non-conforming to the prevailing strategies at the 
time of the crisis. Their experiences span both organizations that were deemed by outside 
observers to have well-weathered the crisis and those that failed during the crisis. 
In total, these interviews were over eleven hours in length and resulted in over 50 
pages of notes. In addition, I supplemented knowledge gained in the interviews by reading 
other first-hand accounts of the crisis, reading journalists’ digests of the crisis, and 
watching or listening to media that portrayed accounts of the crisis. 
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In the course of this research (interviews and archival reading/viewing), I was able 
to gain deeper knowledge of the products, strategies, companies and major players to 
which either praise or blame has been attributed.   
Key Themes Regarding the Cause of the Crisis 
Several key themes arose in the course of this qualitative work. This section 
summarizes interviewee’s comments around three key themes in regard to the causes of 
the crisis: leverage, mortgage distribution and attitudes toward risk. 
 
Leverage. First, most accounts focus on the key role of leverage. In research 
conducted well before the crisis on the consolidation wave that increased the size of bank 
holding companies (BHCs), Demsetz and Strahan wrote “In the past large BHCs used 
their diversification advantage to increase risky lending and to operate with lower capital 
ratios but not to operate at lower levels of overall risk. If this pattern is indicative of the 
behavior of banks involved in today’s merger wave, then we should not expect 
consolidation to reduce bank risk” (1997: 301). Indeed, banks in the 2000s tended to 
remain highly levered, rather than to heed warnings from past crises. As one interviewee 
noted: 
Crisis is most likely to occur when people assume it will never happen. As 
a result, they begin to buy with borrowed money. 
Many decision-makers believed that certain factors, whether that be levels of 
sophistication or changes in technology, justified reduction in capital requirements. With 
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the benefit of hindsight, participants in my interviews focused on the fundamental risk of 
over-leverage within the banking system:  
[The cause of the crisis was] leverage, leverage, leverage… if you have 
enough equity, you ride out any storm. If you don’t, the boat is going to 
sink. We don’t want the boat to sink. Don’t be overleveraged. I spent years 
on the board of a top bank that was relatively unaffected.  
Another interviewee explained how the financial products effectively ratcheted up 
the amount of leverage and exposure within the financial system to the original underlying 
loan: 
When someone takes out a loan, that’s essentially 1 to 5 leverage as good 
loans have 80% loan-to-value. Then, the originator who holds the equity 
would be levered 1 to 10 [10% capital holding requirement]. Then, the 
collateralized debt piece would be 1 to 10, as it would be the first 10 percent 
loss piece. Then, the CDO squared… You were levering existing leverage, 
adding some credit enhancement and then taking more leverage.  
These quotes imply a mixed-level relationship, in that the axioms are implied to 
be true both for consumers and companies, in this case banks. Individual consumers were 
increasingly requesting and receiving loans with limited deposits and these were financed 
by banks or other financial service entities that were holding very limited assets in reserve 
against the risk of default. While banks are (and were) subject to minimum capital 
requirements, these are based on historically-derived models of how risky the loans (assets 
to the bank) are expected to be, and therefore lag changes in the risk in recently-originated 
lending portfolios.  
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Mortgage distribution. Second, most accounts both in the financial press and in 
these interviews indicate the centrality of a focus on mortgage products and a shift by 
many entities to an “originate-to-distribute” model (Bord & Santos, 2012). An originate-
to-distribute model is one in which a firm provides a loan to a borrower and within days 
sells that loan to another firm. The originating entity is referred to as a correspondent and 
the purchaser is often a larger financial institution. At that point, the financial institution 
would package many loans together to create a collateralized debt obligation, an in turn 
sell off most, if not all, of its exposure to those underlying loans. As a result, the entities’ 
with direct knowledge of the individual borrowers had little incentive to complete due 
diligence on the loan. Originators were blinded by the general assumption that house 
prices would rise, pressure to avoid discriminatory lending practices, and at times 
incentives that resulted in the creation of fraudulent documentation, by the loan officer or 
the borrower or both.  
If you want to blame someone, blame Barney Frank’s belief that every 
human being should own a home. There was an assumption that home 
values would increase forever. It was the way business was being done – 
wink, wink on the financing section.  
Certainly numerous individuals, not just one, were involved in creating 
governmental policies that encouraged an increase in U.S. home ownership rates. Barney 
Frank was a congressman who served as chair of the House Financial Services Committee, 
which encouraged and authorized the government sponsored entities Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to provide financing for affordable housing. Partly out of the same 
motivation, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1995 placed requirements on banks to 
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increase mortgage lending in traditionally underserved communities. As discussed above, 
after the loan was originated, the originating correspondent or bank would often sell 
responsibility for the loan almost immediately. This tendency had adverse ramifications 
on lending practices, as surmised by another interviewee: 
In theory, there’s nothing wrong with mortgages and securitization. If I’m 
only going to own [the mortgage] for five minutes, that’s an unhealthy 
thing. 
The consequences of this shift are depicted in the movie The Big Short (McKay, 
2015), when Mark Baum hears accounts from lenders noting that they are originating loans 
to individuals based on bogus information. Baum asks his associates: “I don’t get it. Why 
are they confessing?” only to be told: “They’re not confessing. They’re bragging.” 
Another interviewee expounded on why this phenomenon was able to persist:  
Everyone needs the duration of mortgage bonds, because you can get six 
to seven years of duration. No other instrument gets that duration which 
insurance companies and pension companies need in order to complete 
their asset and liability matching.  
The interviewee continued, explaining how this distorted the manner in which 
banks earned income (note that a tranche refers to the different levels within a 
collateralized debt obligation; higher tranches had higher credit ratings due to greater 
protection against defaults since they were paid first): 
You were making more money from trading [division than from traditional 
lending]. Nobody cared about the value or the risk. These managers whole 
business was buying bonds to sell into tranched cash flows and they made 
their money by charging a management fee. You could make even more 
money from issuing the CDO (credit default obligation).  
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Another interviewee, who served a board member of a bank, expressed concern 
that the many banks developed an unhealthy obsession with a particular class of products 
which were all related to the same underlying pool of mortgages. He or she described the 
risk that resulted as follows:   
To put every chip we have on one product – mortgages – those things can 
bite you. There’s very intricate layering [in mortgage-backed securities and 
related derivatives]. A board member should be able to know that the CEO 
is betting the firm on one product.  
While there were many different types of derivative products – RMBS, CMBS, 
CDO, CDS, ABS, CDO2 – many of them were ultimately based on the performance of 
underlying mortgage portfolios originated in different parts of the country. The risk was 
ultimately inter-related, as explained by a “chef” in The Big Short: 
I ordered my fish on Friday, which is the mortgage bond that Michael Burry 
shorted. But some of the fresh fish doesn't sell. I don't know why. Maybe 
it just came out halibut has the intelligence of a dolphin. So, what am I 
going to do? Throw all this unsold fish, which is the BBB level of the bond, 
in the garbage, and take the loss? No way. Being the crafty and morally 
onerous chef that I am, whatever crappy levels of the bond I don't sell, I 
throw into a seafood stew. See, it's not old fish. It's a whole new thing! And 
the best part is, they're eating 3-day-old halibut. That is a CDO. 
As banks increasingly focused on distribution and appeared to be less dependent 
on the quality of originations, the quality of originations from correspondent channels 
deteriorated as incentives increasingly rewarded origination, as discussed further in the 
next theme.  
 
Attitudes towards risk. A third theme was changing attitudes toward risk: 
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[Some decision-makers] believed that a hedge protects the [profit and loss] 
account, but there’s no perfect hedge. You pay the cost for the protection, 
but you then have a new set of risks, notably credit risk. Not everyone fully 
appreciated that. 
This demand led to the creation of “flow” contracts, where lenders would agree to 
originate a certain value of mortgage loans during a particular time period and pass to 
other entities to bundle the mortgages for securitization. These entities were referred to as 
“manufacturers”, because they were creating the raw material (mortgage loans) that was 
necessary for other financial products to be created. 
Because of the high demand for underlying mortgages and the related securitized 
products, one participant indicated that “[as a trader] you were doing someone a favor to 
give them a bond.” 
To combat this perceived scarcity, some firms in the industry began to pursue 
vertical integration, by purchasing origination and servicing entities that could serve as 
correspondents and originate specifically for the usually larger entity that wished to 
continue to produce securitized products. This integration could also provide more direct 
insight and earlier warnings when borrowers began to miss payments and default on loans. 
As recounted by an interviewee:  
I remember some friends in the industry who travelled to Las Vegas. They 
knew the underlying loans related to some of the deals they were part of 
were there. So when they saw for sale signs everywhere, they started to 
wonder. After that, some of the people at the loan servicers who actually 
get the checks in the mail started noticing that payments were getting 
unusually light. You have to remember there were track homes in the 
middle of nowhere and construction was very levered. Investors might be 
able to last for four or five months (without selling a house) but for 
construction companies they need to sell less than two months after [the 
house] is done. These [construction companies] started defaulting. 
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While these observations may have allowed some parties to recognize the crisis 
much sooner, some banks were generally less exposed to begin with. Interviewees 
speculated on factors that may have been important in this more conservative risk-appetite. 
[Thinking about banks that weathered the crisis well,] culturally they may 
have chosen a more conservative path, more of a commercial banking, 
conservative mindset.  
One interviewee recalled a tag line from a 1979 Smith Barney commercial with 
John Houseman: “They make money the old-fashioned way; they earn it.” While 
historically banks might accrue earnings over time by lending over a long duration, the 
short-term focus on earnings meant that many banks shifted to obtain a greater portion of 
their earnings from fee-based products. One interviewee described a particular investment 
bank as follows:  
[That company] was part of the machine. It goes to culture. Investment 
bankers are a bunch of aggressive assholes. [They were] more like Enron-
aggressive. They thought they were doing right. They’d start to chase a 
complex transaction halfway down the alley. The CEO managed by fear 
and had no idea how severe the run on the bank would be. If it hadn’t been 
them, it could have easily been [one of the other investment banks]. 
Similarly, another interviewee suggested: 
Like every investment bank, [a bank that failed] was trying to be Goldman 
Sachs. 
In summary, interviewees suggested that banks took more aggressive risk 
positions, some of which can be described as a shift from a traditional-banking mindset to 
more of an investment banking mindset. This meant that bank earnings were increasingly 
dependent on income from fees rather than interest and were arguably more focused on 
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trading activity than on holding loans on their own balance sheet until maturity. In 
simplifying this perspective, one interviewee defined the objectives of the two different 
approaches as follows: 
Traditional banking is simply loan and repayment. Investment banking is 
about creating instruments or securities to hopefully sell into the market 
place. 
This represented a substantial shift for many of the banks that traced their history 
to traditional or commercial banking. One long-time executive interviewee explained: 
Historically, you didn’t get rich off of commercial banking. You had a nice 
life and could afford everything you needed and then have a nice 
retirement, but you didn’t get ‘wealthy.’ Over time that began to change. 
You had people realize you could really make more money from financial 
transactions [than from interest on loans]. In seeking profits, banks began 
to pay for people who were willing to successfully take more risk. I saw in 
the industry a willingness to pursue market share and revenue growth. We 
became more tolerant of losses.  
This executive indicated a belief that while it is common in banking to evaluate 
risk-return trade-offs, that banks eventually began to take more risk than they were being 
compensated for in the pursuit of short-term profits. The shift also came with a different 
set of rules and expectations. Because investment banks were believed to fulfill of a role 
of ‘market-making’, they could legally create and market securities even if they did not 
believe in the long-term viability of the security. Many commercial banks were more 
likely to have policies to not market any securities to clients if the bank was not willing to 
continue its own ownership. The previous legal restrictions of Glass-Steagall were altered 
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, removing previous limitations that separated the 
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different roles of commercial banks from those of investment banks. In the words of an 
interviewee: 
Regulators allowed Citigroup to go forward [with acquiring Salomon 
Smith Barney] and that allowed investment bankers to begin to utilize the 
balance sheet of a commercial bank. That gave them tremendous power in 
the market place. They could tell clients, “You don’t have to worry; we’ll 
park it until it sells.” Regulatory bodies didn’t grow with this change and 
now they were looking at transactions about which they had no clue. For 
bank examiners, it was like the difference between examining a giraffe 
instead of a cow. 
These changes initially led to higher reported bank earnings, both as the industry 
consolidated, and as banks reaped the benefits of this new stream of fee-based earnings. 
One interviewee recounted that at times when market volatility was high, segments of the 
bank could make their entire budgeted earnings for the year in only a month or two. These 
earnings were less predictable as the trades also could have resulted in significant losses 
and because they were not necessarily repeatable in future periods. While banks generally 
preferred to establish “relationship earnings” with long-standing customers who were also 
large borrowers, when the U.S. economy was performing well, trading and securities 
revenues contributed a significant portion of profits for many banks. Ultimately then, the 
crisis was essentially unexpected by most industry participants: 
Residential mortgage backed securities make a big assumption that 
correlation is low between the loans – they are the pure, ultimate 
correlation product. That was always the assumption. Since you were 
buying from different shelves and different geographies, you thought you’d 
be okay and the models all assumed a distribution of correlations. All of 
the models used historic data. Before this, there was never a nationwide 
house price decline. That had never happened, so it wouldn’t go into the 
model.  Maybe if interest rates were going up, you’d be concerned, but they 
stayed down from 9/11 on.  
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Similarly, another interviewee reflected on how bankers were caught unaware: 
In the financial industry, people knew the risks. It’s like a radar screen for 
a pilot – you’re only good as far your radar goes. When your mind’s on 
something else, you don’t focus on some of the indicators you’re seeing 
that suggest there might be a storm later in your path. We’ve always had 
crises. It was real estate in ’74-’75, country defaults in the 80’s, and then 
savings and loan, then the tech bubble of 2002. Each one caught the banks 
by surprise, but they were all driven by different motivations. The most 
recent crisis I would say was driven by the short-term nature and 
perspective of management. I would say that [many banks] shifted to a 
greater risk-taking culture, moving from a focus on long-term to short-term 
results. In some ways, it’s the difference between a commercial banker and 
an investment banker. 
In many ways then, the success of mortgage-related products sowed the seeds for 
its downfall. As demand for underlying mortgages increased in the financial system, 
originators increasingly responded to the rewards available for continued origination. 
The normal checks and balances that existed within institutions failed to maintain 
origination standards due to faulty assumptions that 1) real estate prices would generally 
continue to rise; 2) correlations between defaults would remain low, which presumed the 
factors driving some borrowers to default were independent of circumstances facing 
other borrowers; and 3) adequate cushions could be put in place to protect certain 
“investment-grade” tranches of collateralized mortgage-related products. 
Retrospectively, a number of representations in the process have been deemed to be 
fraudulent and/or illegal. 
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Key Themes Regarding the Role of the Board 
Those whom I interviewed indicated multiple considerations for the role of the 
board. In this section, I summarize their comments regarding the board’s interaction with 
the CEO, industry expertise, desirable qualities, and influence on firm performance. 
Interaction with the CEO. Management practice and the management literature 
are generally consistent in the expectation that board members are not pseudo-managers 
of the company. Instead, the board is expected to be a group of individuals who hold 
several key mandates, including to monitor the company’s performance, to assess the 
CEO’s performance and to be involved in strategic decision making. This view was 
reflected in the views of the interviewees:  
The board has to let management run the company. Our job is to pick the 
CEO and know when to fire him. [Board members] can have talent in 
business but if those businesses are unrelated it’s harder to evaluate 
financial instruments and other technical stuff like the level of 
concentration, risk management and hedging strategies. You could have a 
really successful CEO from industry who is battle tested but has only ever 
done currency hedging. It’s going to be harder to know when to intervene. 
The statement reflects the belief that currency hedging is one of the more simplistic 
derivative products that a bank would create, market and trade as part of its operations. 
Currency products are common because many companies conducting business in more 
than one geography would have motivation to limit their exposure to more volatile 
currencies. Board members from other industries would have had few opportunities to 
observe the performance credit default swaps, credit default obligations and other asset-
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backed securities. These products had significant influence on the overall performance of 
the bank, yet unfamiliarity might have limited board members from exercise oversight 
over these portfolios or knowing when their bank’s performance was at risk as a result.  
While CEOs are held accountable, interviewees acknowledged the limited ability 
of even the chief-decision maker to consider all of the pertinent facts: 
The CEO is important, but not the sole decider of governance. He or she 
can’t know everything either within the organization or within the board.  
Active monitoring by a board is an important function. One individual who 
served as a bank CEO during the crisis noted that high levels of monitoring can at times 
feel like having multiple bosses: 
[As a CEO], it’s draining to work with an attentive board, but it made my 
job easier because the board members were [helping identify potential 
issues]. 
Indeed, the same interviewee acknowledged that this is a key shift compared to 
earlier in his/her career.  
A good board member needs to be challenging the CEO and the executive 
committee. The days of joining a board to get paid a fee and go to four 
meetings are over, or they should be. 
In thinking more specifically about what role boards could have played in helping 
to avert the major bank failures that occurred during the Financial Crisis, one interviewee 
suggested that: “Boards were too reactive and not anticipatory.” Another felt that boards 
were complicit in decisions that were not beneficial to their shareholders. 
When subprime came unglued, you had [banks] step forward and acquire 
[entities] who had sold hundreds of billions in mortgage-related products 
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that still had remaining liability. It’s like eating Typhoid Mary and hoping 
we don’t catch it. That’s a curious way to protect your shareholders. The 
board (and the Fed) should have said no.” 
Multiple interviewees downplayed the role of changing compensation schemes as 
having any ability to fix or change the issue going forward. 
When you get to this level, you usually don’t need the monetary 
compensation that comes with it. For me I’m driven by that appetite to 
learn. We have a robust discussion about what’s going on in the world [on 
the board]. Frankly, the compensation doesn’t make a difference in my 
lifestyle. 
While the management literature has continued to theoretically and empirically 
examine how compensation is a tool for incentive alignment, this director’s statement is 
consistent with recent observations in the literature that directors have multiple 
motivations for their service (Boivie et al., 2012).   
 
Industry experience and relevant expertise. As discussed in previous chapters, 
industry experience is a potentially valuable aspect of the human and social capital that a 
board member can contribute through their service on the corporate board. Industry 
expertise was a key theme in the interviews. One participant conveyed the typical view 
that broad business experience is necessary on a board: 
You need at least one independent expert and then fill it out with good 
business guys. 
This was a more accommodating stance than most interviewees expressed, for 
instance, one said: 
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I don’t think that to be on our board you needed to be a banker, but you 
should have a fairly good knowledge of finance. It’s important to be able 
to understand the strategies and intent of the different [lines of banking] 
businesses. Otherwise, you’re just another independent set of eyes. There’s 
nothing wrong with being another set of independent eyes if you’re doing 
your homework, but there’s a lot of nuance for understanding a bank and 
what can happen to a bank’s assets. 
In particular, most participants noted the complexity of financial instruments and 
of the banks as well. This complexity presented a difficult challenge for board members 
that, in the opinion of some, requires a particular industry experience. 
Financial instruments are so big and so complex. I’ve been [a bank 
executive] for a number years and still don’t know if I’m in a position to 
ask the hard questions. And, what we do here in the U.S. is the most vanilla 
[simplistic version of derivatives]. London has more complex [derivatives] 
and the really exotic is in Switzerland. 
Participants reflected on how much industry expertise that board members should 
have, and tended to have similar views. 
Should there be industry expertise? I’m never going to complain about 
more experience [in financial services]. Others can’t know just because 
they have experience in other industries – it’s too complex. But there is a 
role for a fresh perspective. I don’t know what the right balance is.  
Another interviewee expressed much more strongly a need for financial expertise:  
When serving [on the board at] a global bank, if you have knowledge of 
finance, it allows you to understand the balance sheet of the institution 
much better than if you don’t and that’s also true for the P&L [income 
statement]. [It’s a risk] if you don’t have the background to ask “Why are 
these off-balance sheet transactions and are they going to come back [to 
affect us in the future]?” Changing values of a security position can affect 
[a bank’s] capital base and sometimes those questions weren’t being asked. 
A CEO of a manufacturing company is not used to dealing with those 
issues; a Chairman of a technology company is not used to dealing with 
those issues. They may be an engineer or have creative skills, but they’d 
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generally rely on someone else to look at those factors in their own 
business.  
Another respondent suggested a balance between expertise and outside 
perspectives: 
There need to be people on the board that tie to the expertise of the 
company. Then maybe have a couple of free agents with a different 
perspective.   
Potentially, the exact expertise may need to be tailored to the particular institution.  
[This bank] had a large portfolio of derivatives, so you need someone who 
understood those.  
To some extent, the issues facing board members of banks were still similar to 
those experienced in other industries of large scale and scope. 
The magnitude and complexity of [the bank I worked for] was immense. 
[Like several of the other large banks], we were in over 100 countries and 
I had over a dozen direct reports. Because of our size, the board of 
governors [of the Federal Reserve] was very worried and wanted to know 
what we were doing to correct and address the risks we were facing. 
In combination, all of the interviewees communicated their belief that banking was 
uniquely complex, even above and beyond what is experienced in other large institutions 
and that a particular skill set was necessary. While noting at times the potential benefits 
of diversity – including gender diversity for instance – these individuals communicated a 
strong preference for a majority of directors to have specific knowledge of the financial 
sector. 
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Qualities of a good director. Another theme that emerged from the interviews was 
participants’ views on what qualities were essential for a good director to possess. These 
thoughts are in line with prior literature examining board dynamics. For instance, 
interviewees applauded the willingness to speak up and voice an opinion: 
My definition of a good director is someone, I don’t know, who will voice 
their opinion. Usually there’s 2-3 board members who will speak their 
mind and others go along with the strongest voices. The beauty of a good 
board is that it has 11 opinions – good brains. They have a good healthy 
debate and then reach a conclusion. When that’s present, odds are we will 
make a good decision. Ninety-percent of decisions are unanimous, but the 
crucial ones are where it’s most important. 
Second, participants were critical of the key of director independence as 
traditionally defined:  
The most important characteristic is backbone. Independence is mostly 
meaningless. There are lots of independent Americans; very few of them 
should be on the board of a large sophisticated bank. 
This is not dissimilar to a progression in the literature that has now shifted to a 
focus on board composition characteristics with less emphasis on director independence 
(Johnson, et al., 2013). However, others did note that directors with prior relationships 
with the CEO or possessing another form of celebrity status were less likely to be effective.  
People on the board need to ask questions. They need to be on the board 
because of something that they bring to the table, not because they are a 
neighbor or a celebrity.  
Another interviewee reflected on the complications in trying to assess whether a 
particular director is truly independent. 
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You have to ask “what’s their relationship to the chairman of the board or 
with the CEO?” To get a sense of an independent board. You can look to 
see if they’re taking tough decisions regarding compensation. Do they react 
to the performance of the company [and change CEO pay]?  
Have they been around [on the board] for a long-time? If it’s more than 10-
12 years, they bring expertise but the risk is that some of that expertise 
might not be put into practice. But at the same time, I’m working with one 
chairman who has been there 15 years and is the most independent board 
member I know.   
Third, directors indicated the need for a certain level of time commitment and 
effort on the part of a good director. 
Are they people who understand your company and are they investing the 
amount of time necessary? The idea of a busy board member – that is a 
truism. If you’re going to do it right, you’re going to have to invest time. 
For me it’s a matter of personal pride, and I never want someone in the 
company to think that I would show up unprepared.  
 
On firm failure and too big to fail. Participants also reflected on the theme of the 
board as it pertains to firm failure or the notion of “too big to fail.” Participants did believe 
that the board could play an important role in firm governance. 
Governance is critical to the success or failure of an entity. It’s when things 
go wrong that you really need the board. 
However, this did not mean that they ascribed to the view that boards should be 
considered responsible for the fate of the company. 
I’ve worked with good boards that ended up in bankruptcy, maybe because 
of product life cycle or union issues. Good companies have fallen and it’s 
not necessarily because the governance was bad.  Others sometimes just 
didn’t have the right people in the driver’s seat. 
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Certainly this connects to the overall direction of this research: are there certain 
environmental contexts under which the board is most able to exert influence? 
Alternatively, are there certain situations in which the board composition is irrelevant 
because the firm’s situation is too dire to salvage? Can the failure of a firm be traced 
back to a key strategic decision that should have been made differently or a point in time 
when the board should have intervened, for instance by replacing the CEO?  
Finally, at least one participant believed that banks have indeed grown ‘too big to 
manage.’ 
We have enough regulation; the pendulum has swung too far. The theme is 
that these banks are too big and too complex to manage. No one human 
being can be CEO of such a massive enterprise. Even GE Capital almost 
brought down [Jack] Welch.  
Another interviewee voiced concern that market participants and regulators have 
not sufficiently learned from or altered their practices in light of the past Financial 
Crisis. 
Very limited learning has taken place. Are we in 2005 or 2006? Maybe, 
but for different reasons. Our economy and what underpins it are still being 
propped up by various tools and those haven’t been withdrawn. It won’t be 
housing in Las Vegas or mortgage-backed securities, but there are other 
events that could shake our financial system down to its roots again. While 
there are those who take comfort in Dodd-Frank and plans that have been 
drawn up to liquidate banks in an emergency or a crisis, we will find those 
measures to be lacking. The imbalances in regulation mean that there are 
now many unregulated counterparties that form essentially a shadow-
banking system. The SIFIs [systematically important financial institutions] 
are still making the financial system shaky and now the Fed [Federal 
Reserve], the lender of last resort, is more restricted than before and less 
able to act quickly in a crisis. 
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Conclusions 
These interviews, focusing on the experiences of key individuals during the crisis 
and their reflections on the role of the board, provided valuable direction for refining and 
interpreting the empirical results and evaluating avenues for future research. The 
information gleaned from these interviews confirms that strategic norms are likely to 
evolve in an industry that are difficult to challenge. The interviews suggest mixed feelings 
as to whether there are any particular board characteristics that can be known a priori to 
be more beneficial than others in seeking to avert firm failure. Further, the interviews 
suggest a lack of consensus as to how much industry experience is necessary to add value 
in the boardroom. The results from the quantitative analysis in this dissertation provide 
evidence as to the value of industry experience. However, there may be other qualities of 
directors from outside the industry that increase their ability to provide a valuable 
contribution to the board’s performance, in this case financial expertise. In turn, a board 
that fulfill its roles of monitoring and resource provision can contribute to improved firm 
performance. 
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CHAPTER VII  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Past research on board attributes has provided only limited support for the 
theoretical expectation that boards affect the performance of the firm (Boivie et al., 2016). 
Accordingly, some scholars have recently led the charge to examine “how outside 
directors’ contributions to boards may vary based on their skills, experiences, and other 
relevant credentials” (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009: 982), as these “varied knowledge 
bases, experiences and connections can determine how effectively they question, assess, 
inform and influence managerial action” (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009: 1098). 
In this stream, scholars have been able to demonstrate that additional board capital 
isn’t universally beneficial, thus far primarily concentrating on the potential “liability of 
expertise” or potential issues that can arise because boards are a group of people and 
therefore group dynamics are relevant. However, boards may indeed have an important, 
positive influence on the performance of their firms – it just may be limited to particular 
situations and require a particular set of skills appropriate to be valuable in those 
circumstances. 
The mixed findings of this dissertation research both aid and confound the efforts 
of scholars to understand board effects. Board composition was shown to be associated 
with particular types of firm strategies and the industry experience of board members was 
shown to be more valuable than breadth in this industry in which the transferability of 
general human capital is categorized as low. This is further augmented by the finding that 
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financial expertise was valuable following an environmental shock; importantly, this 
benefit is shown to be distinct from industry experience alone. On the other hand, the lack 
of findings in regard to environmental shock as a moderator of depth or breadth suggest 
that the contribution of directors may be limited compared to the overriding nature of 
environmental and firm effects. Even a board with optimal composition may struggle to 
exert meaningful influence over the firm’s actions and strategic positioning. This requires 
careful interpretation as to the types of decisions on which a board is likely to be involved. 
Certainly, a number of studies have focused on the board’s role in the key decision 
of hiring or firing the CEO, a key responsibility indicated by participants in the interviews. 
Yet, boards may increasingly exert influence on strategic decision-making of the firm, 
serving either to support or challenge the CEO. The findings in this research suggest that 
board composition may indeed be associated with the extent to which firm strategies 
conform or deviate from industry norms.  
Importantly, this research also provides evidence to suggest that some effects may 
only be observable over a longer horizon. Different strategies come with their own risks 
such that a focus on absolute performance in the near-term may obscure the benefits 
obtained from alternate strategies. In this context, strategic deviation is associated with 
lower volatility of returns in future periods. These results suggest that firms that choose to 
conform to industry norms are then most buffeted by the economic cycle of that industry. 
Firms that chart their own paths may able to secure returns that are less subject to the 
industry’s trajectory. However, we should consider whether firms in other industries with 
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much smaller total capital at their disposal experience similar benefits. Notably, implicit 
government guarantees may also distort these risk-return relationships.  
These findings also highlight an intriguing interchange. These results indicate that 
related expertise (in this case finance and accounting background) can be valuable, 
alongside industry-specific experience. Considering board dynamics has led a 
considerable portion of the research to focus on the trade-offs that may exist between 
board breadth and board depth, mostly considering whether board members should be 
industry insiders or industry outsiders. To some extent, this mirrors more macro-level past 
research on director independence. As indicated in the previous chapter, participants in 
the sector note that independence alone may be insufficient for predicting the ability of a 
board member to be an effective monitor. Determining whether someone has sufficient 
expertise to serve as a monitor and resource provider becomes more complex when the 
board faces situations in which general broad business knowledge may not be sufficiently 
applicable. One novelty of this research, then, is in the examination of how industry 
experience diverges from potentially applicable expertise. 
Scholars may thus need to consider a more nuanced classification of directors that 
sets a higher bar than breadth alone. Certainly, many facets of diversity that contribute to 
cognitive diversity will continue to be beneficial in the boardroom, as research on gender 
diversity and racial diversity has shown. But, achieving an equal-mix of functional or 
industry backgrounds, which is at times implied by breadth calculations, may indeed be 
harmful to the board and in turn to the firm. Past research has indicated that most 
executives could be classified as generalists and that “types and effects of experience may 
  
106 
 
be more complex than previously suggested” (Hitt & Tyler, 1991: 345). Continuing to 
develop a more nuanced view as to what types of past experience are pertinent for board 
members to bring to bear on the firm’s environment may remain a fruitful line of inquiry. 
This research also emphasizes the importance of the availability of resources. 
Resources are frequently abundant or munificent during times of industry growth and 
expansion. In these settings, the availability of resources may increase concerns that they 
may be appropriated or that the various stakeholders, including management, may have 
divergent interests. Accordingly, agency concerns are paramount as governance 
mechanisms are used to align interests where possible and guard or protect the firm’s 
resources. To the extent that contingency theory is predictive, firms will dynamically adapt 
to this environment by properly developing their governance structures to fit this 
environment. Firms are best served when resources are available to appoint board 
members who increase the ability of the board to carry out its monitoring function; 
therefore, changes in board composition should lead to increased board capital depth. A 
pertinent research question then is: Will firms be more likely to improve the board’s ability 
to monitor by appointing board members who increase board capital depth during periods 
of growth for the industry?  
In contrast, an environmental disruption or shock is likely to be characterized by 
scarcity of certain resources. Firms may no longer be able to rely on past resource streams 
and earnings and capital positions may suffer. In the absence of resources to monitor or 
disburse, agency concerns become less paramount. Instead, the ability of the board to 
contribute unique and valuable resources may become focal. Board members’ interests are 
  
107 
 
likely to be increasingly in sync with one another, the top management team and 
shareholders, as there may be stigma for the directors and executives associated with the 
company that fails and shareholders suffer significant financial loss. Despite this 
alignment, monitoring may still increase relative to normal operating conditions as the 
board actively seeks to ensure survival of the firm. However, the board may have a 
heightened sense of responsibility and commitment to contributing their skills and 
information for the firm’s benefit. From the firm’s perspective then, the diversity of the 
resources that the board can provide becomes more beneficial than before. Again, from 
the perspective of contingency theory, prior research suggests that the firm should 
dynamically adapt to fit this environmental condition, including by altering board 
composition to best manage resource scarcity. The breadth of board capital increases the 
access, flow and novelty of information to the firm. However, future research may 
consider whether the board members who are adding breadth to the board have sufficient 
relevant expertise to be able to leverage that access, flow and novelty in this particular 
context. Indeed, in highly complex industries, if breadth of human capital is achieved at 
the detriment of relevant expertise, firm performance may suffer.  
Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to contingency theory as well as to the corporate 
governance literature. First, contingency theory is an important lens for understanding 
how a firm’s positioning and profile fit with certain environments and thereby affect firm 
performance. Contingency theory suggests that firms would alter their strategies or other 
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characteristics to perform better when the environment changes. This research suggests 
that a firm’s performance may also be affected by attributes or resources of the firm that 
were already in place, but not readily apparent. Specifically in this context, the financial 
expertise of directors is a resource that is shown to be valuable to the firm in some 
circumstances, and not in others. Thus, changes in the firm’s fit for the environment may 
not require change by the firm. Literature drawing on contingency theory can benefit from 
a better understanding of how a firm may preemptively fit future environments how a firm 
must consider more than only the current environment. While dynamic strategic fit may 
involve adaptation to rapidly-changing environments, it may also be possible to be 
prepared for other environmental situations that could arise.  
Second, the corporate governance literature has increasingly focused on the 
contingency of capital. This dissertation contributes to that discussion by identifying that 
environmental conditions are a critical factor to consider when examining board human 
and social capital, including breadth of backgrounds, depth of industry experience, and 
relevant expertise. The board compositions that are valuable in one context may not be 
suitable to optimize a board’s performance when the environment changes. Further, these 
results suggest that boards may benefit from specific rather than general capital, whereas 
a significant portion of past research assumes that most board capital is broadly 
transferable. 
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Future Research  
In contemplating the implications of this dissertation, there are several questions 
that are derived from and natural extensions of this work.  
First, board qualities may interact with other non-board attributes relevant to the 
context, such as those of the CEO. While in general, boards may be seeking new recipes 
during crisis, the threat-rigidity expectation may apply in specific scenarios. One such 
scenario is whether the board is likely to dismiss the CEO. As previously indicated, boards 
with greater depth may be more embedded or entrenched in the industry. As such, even in 
the face of shock, crisis and turbulence, these board members may believe that the market 
will eventually return to its prior state. They may particularly value the expertise of 
industry insiders and discount the expectations of those with lower levels of expertise. 
Accordingly, I expect board depth to affect the assessment of the CEO’s performance and 
whether the firm’s performance is internally or externally attributed. These board 
members may identify closely with the CEO and believe that there is little the firm could 
have done to have avoided the disruption because it affected most firms in the industry. 
Therefore, I expect they will be less likely to dismiss the CEO and continue to hold that 
the CEO’s expertise will be valuable in navigating the crisis. 
Second, while the board monitoring function has long been a key focus of research 
on boards, the resource provision function is also of vital importance (Hillman, Nicholson, 
& Shropshire, 2008; Hillman et al., 2009). For instance, young firms have been shown to 
benefit from the relevant industry experience of outside directors, which may substitute 
for a lack of such experience amongst the top management team (Kori & Misangyi, 2008). 
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Empirically, scholars have utilized various measures to explore the extent to which board 
members are likely to provide valuable resources. These include board size, directors who 
serve on other boards, directors who are CEOs of other firms, directors with specific 
functional experiences, and directors with accumulated tenure on the board (de Villiers et 
al., 2011).  
Perhaps even more than monitoring, resource provision by directors is difficult to 
observe. Thus, I focus on actions taken by the firm that would indicate a desire to increase 
the ability of the board to provide resources during periods of environmental disruption 
compared to non-crisis periods. Specifically, I suggest further consideration of a firm’s 
appointment of new directors. 
Firms have been shown to alter the membership of the board of directors in order 
to deal effectively with their environmental conditions (Hillman et al., 2000). Further, 
directors may choose to exit a firm when it is in crisis (Withers, Corley, et al., 2012), 
resulting in an opportunity to replace the outgoing director. In addition, environmental 
dynamism can increase the likelihood that a board member will exit from his/her current 
appointment and also reduce the likelihood of joining additional boards (Withers, 2011). 
Finally, firms may alter the composition of their board to send signals to the market 
(Sundaramurthy et al., 2014). 
Third, despite this significant body of work on director appointments (Withers, 
Hillman, & Cannella, 2012) and director exit (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012), little 
empirical evidence exists to predict how the environmental context may alter a firm’s 
board appointments and subsequent performance. Similarly, while there is considerable 
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work on director human and social capital of individual director selections, less attention 
has been given to how depth and breadth affect subsequent changes to the board based on 
board-level characteristics. For directors who serve on multiple boards, board interactions 
may be different based on the strategic context (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001) such that 
these directors are more likely to increase their engagement with the firm through either 
monitoring or resource provision during times of crisis and their experiences are more 
likely to be considered valuable.  
Generally speaking, director turnover is a relatively infrequent event, because 
elections are held no more frequently than once per year and terms often are for multiple 
years. Even for firms that hold annual elections for all directors, which is generally 
considered a corporate governance best-practice, many directors are consistently re-
elected; for example, average board tenure for U.S. Fortune 500 firms is 8.4 years 
(Spencer, 2014).  
Similar to the logic presented earlier herein, the environmental conditions which 
affect the availability of resources are also likely to change firms’ approaches to board 
composition. Both rational and social perspectives affect director selection (Withers, 
Hillman, et al., 2012). In the rational perspective, a firm is believed to appoint directors 
who fulfill particular needs of the firm and that best improve the firm’s likelihood of 
success. In contrast, the social perspective suggests that social processes influence which 
director is appointed; for instance, the power of the CEO may influence appointments. 
Thus, holding known social influences constant, environmental factors can be expected to 
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alter selection processes. Generally, one key factor that can vary in regard to 
environmental factors is the availability of resources, ranging from abundant to scarce. 
Finally, this dissertation suggests that certain board characteristics may “fit” a 
particular environmental context and thereby are associated with higher performance in 
those contexts. Indeed, the key desired outcome of fit is improved firm performance 
(Volberda, van der Weerdt, Verwaal, Stienstra, & Verdu, 2012). The role of fit as a key 
tenet of contingency theory (and other related theories) is to suggest that the organizations 
having attributes that are most congruent with the current operating environment 
outperform those organizations with attributes that are less congruent (Volberda et al., 
2012). A significant amount of recent research on fit in the strategic management literature 
relies on cross-sectional samples in which environmental variables (e.g. environmental 
dynamism) vary across industries (Volberda et al., 2012). However, contingency theory 
also is focused on the response of the organization. While board composition is generally 
stable, firms may benefit from altering their board composition to increase board capital 
breadth. Stated differently, is it the absolute level of fit or the change in fit that best predicts 
an organization’s likelihood to weather a change in conditions?  
A significant amount of the research on organizational adaptation to changes in the 
environment is centered on the discussion of an organization’s structural inertia (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984). For instance, research on organizational change has examined the 
benefits and drawbacks of structural inertia, suggesting that disrupting established routines 
can reduce an organization’s likelihood of survival (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1984). However, environmental shocks can increase failure; in a 
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sample of Finnish newspapers, these shocks included a civil war (Amburgey et al., 1993).  
Accordingly, scholars pose the question: “Can organizations learn about their 
environments and change strategies and structures as quickly as their environments 
change?” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984: 151). A stronger but dynamic view of environmental 
determinism would lead to the same implication: strategic changes of the organization can 
be predicted based on the relevant environmental forces (Zajac et al., 2000). 
One key question herein is whether organizations alter the composition of their 
board to match the shifting environment. This may depend in part on whether the board 
was perceived as strong or weak when the crisis hit. In a sample of German orchestras, 
environmental changes that altered resource contingencies had differential affects such 
that organizations that were already weak were more likely to replace existing leaders, 
while organizations already in a position of strength would be more likely to rely on 
existing leadership (Allmendinger & Hackman, 1996).   
An additional question is whether performance advantages accrue to firms that 
alter board composition to be responsive and adaptive to the changing conditions. 
Research on strategic fit indicates that fit (or misfit) affects organizational performance 
(Zajac et al., 2000). This relationship is notable in the case of environmental shocks; a 
particular type of disruption during which the fit or misfit of the organization for the 
environment may change rapidly. A slow response by the organization, or a failure to 
respond at all, can have devastating consequences if the firm is properly aligned for the 
new business environment. In contrast, the degree to which firms that are responsive to 
the environment – in this case, specifically by altering their board composition – will 
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influence the degree to which they experience an improvement in performance relative to 
similar firms whose boards remain constant; this effect would be above and beyond the 
performance predicted by fit alone.   
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to this study that also highlight opportunities for 
future research. First, while the hypotheses were theoretically-derived without regard to 
industry, this research was executed in a single-industry study and with a focus on a 
particular crisis. It would not be appropriate to generalize these findings to other industries 
without undertaking additional studies. This limitation is particularly important because, 
as highlighted, banking and financial services have a number of distinctive features as 
compared to other sectors. The importance of specialized knowledge suggested within this 
context may be less critical to the extent that human capital is more general and 
transferable from one sector to another. Similarly, the economic shock that is the focus of 
this research was of far greater magnitude than most, with contagion effects to numerous 
other countries and with ramifications across most sectors of the economy. This may result 
in different effects than would occur in more isolated shocks or other cyclical downturns. 
Rather than the intended effect in the research design of being able to identify whether 
board members rise to the occasion, the severity of this crisis could mean that there is little 
precedent for board members to on which to rely and their experience or expertise that 
would be valuable in most situations is rendered irrelevant.  
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Second, bank boards may also differ substantially from the boards of other 
companies because banks are some of the largest organizations in the world and are subject 
to intense regulation and scrutiny. This belief seems to be held by board members within 
the industry, who, in interviews, indicated that banks require a particular type of expertise. 
Thus, the pool from which individuals may be selected already has significant range 
restrictions even when compared to the board members of publicly-listed firms. This may 
limit the ability to determine how variation of human and social capital can influence firm 
outcomes. 
Third, scholars have recently indicated limitations that boards may face in 
executing their monitoring responsibilities (Boivie et al., 2016). Because the current 
research is not able to determine the effort expended by the directors or any limitations 
they faced in executing their responsibilities, an alternate explanation is that those factors 
could override the potential influence of board characteristics.  
Conclusion 
This research further contributes to the understanding of the contingency of board 
capital by providing evidence that 1) a primary mechanism for board influence is when 
the board is mobilized to influence the strategic direction of the firm, 2) environmental 
conditions significantly affect whether board effects are manifest, 3) the benefits of certain 
board composition and characteristics are variable, contingent upon the time span over 
which performance is measured, and finally 4) greater nuance may be necessary to 
consider when certain types of expertise can be valuable even when not obtained from 
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experience within the industry. Enhancing theory around how boards can help avert 
strategic conformity and exposure to asset bubbles has the potential to generate valuable 
insights for both scholarship and practice.   
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APPENDIX A-1 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Hypothesis Summary Finding 
1 Conforming firms have higher 
variation in performance than 
deviating firms. 
Supported.  
2 Crisis moderates the relationship 
between conformity and 
performance such that deviation is 
more valuable in times of crisis 
than in other environmental 
conditions. 
 
Main effect is present such that 
deviation is associated with higher 
firm performance; however, the 
interaction term is not significant 
hence there is no support for 
strategic deviation becoming more 
valuable during times of crisis.  
3 Board composition affects 
strategic conformity of the firm 
such that board breadth (functional 
diversity) leads to greater strategic 
conformity. 
Supported.  
4 In the banking industry where 
transferability of human capital is 
low, industry experience more 
favorably affects performance than 
breadth. 
Supported. 
5 Crisis moderates the relationship 
between board depth of industry 
experience and firm performance, 
such that depth improves 
performance following an 
economic shock. 
Not supported when performance 
is measured for one year. 
However, the interaction effect is 
significant in additional tests that 
examine performance over a 
longer time frame. 
6 Crisis moderates the relationship 
between board capital breadth and 
firm performance such that 
breadth improves performance 
following an economic shock. 
Not supported. Even over a longer 
time frame, breadth is found to 
have a negative relationship on 
future performance. 
7 Crisis moderates the relationship 
between board depth of relevant 
expertise and firm performance, 
such that expertise is valuable to 
the firm during periods of 
environmental shock for the 
industry. 
Supported 
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APPENDIX B-1 
 REVIEW OF INDICATORS 
 
 
 
Review of Indicators Used in the Literature to Assess Strategic Conformity 
Strategic Indicator Example of Measurement Relevant Studies 
Resource 
Deployment 
  
   Across functions Advertising intensity, capital 
intensity, plant and 
equipment newness & R&D 
intensity, overhead 
efficiency, financial leverage, 
(also dividend policy and 
unsystematic risk) 
Geletkanycz & Hambrick 
(1997), Finkelstein & Hambrick 
(1990), Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick (1997) 
   Asset allocations Percentage of assets across 
bank product markets (e.g., 
commercial loans, real estate 
loans, cash, fixed assets, etc.)  
Delgado-Garcia & De la 
Fuente-Sabate (2010), 
Deephouse (1999), Haveman 
(1993) 
Financing 
Approach 
Financial leverage, dividend 
policy 
Miller et al. (2013) 
Product Related   
   Introductions Imitation Semadeni & Anderson (2010) 
   Variety Range across genres, 
programming similarity 
Miller & Shamsie (1999), Wang 
& Shaver (2014) 
   Pricing Product margins are similar 
across firms 
 
Competitive 
Reactions 
Mimicry, rivalry Chen & Miller (2012) 
Corporate Strategy 
/ Diversification 
  
   Acquisitions Number of acquisitions Haunschild (1993) 
   International entry Mimetic influence of prior 
entries by competitors 
Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, & 
Wan (2005), Belderbos, Van 
Olffen, & Zou (2011) 
Market Responses Unsystematic risk Miller et al. (2013) 
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APPENDIX B-2 
BANKS WITH OVER $100B ASSETS IN 2007 
 
BoardEx 
ID 
Company  Assets per Form 
Y-9C 
Tier 1 
Capital 
ROA% Fees 
  Billions   as a % 
of NII 
6930 CITIGROUP INC 2,187.63  4.1% 0.17% 27% 
4504 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 1,720.69  4.8% 0.87% 32% 
17528 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 1,562.15  5.7% 0.98% 63% 
33003 WACHOVIA CORP (De-listed 
12/2008) 
782.90  5.6% 0.81% 32% 
33264 WELLS FARGO & CO 575.44  6.4% 1.40% 49% 
20426 METLIFE INC 558.56  5.5% 0.77% 180% 
31946 US BANCORP 237.62  7.4% 1.82% 54% 
29586 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 179.57  6.4% 0.91% 32% 
5734 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL 
CORP 
150.59  8.2% 1.72% 68% 
21537 NATIONAL CITY CORP  
(De-listed 12/2008) 
150.38  6.2% 0.21% 28% 
29131 STATE STREET CORP 142.94  5.0% 0.88% 127% 
550049 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 141.04  6.0% 0.99% 34% 
24669 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES 
GROUP IN 
138.98  5.6% 1.06% 62% 
3718 BB&T CORP 132.62  6.9% 1.31% 35% 
324 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 110.96  8.0% 0.97% 37% 
 
